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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
THE PURPOSE OF MY DISSERTATION. The purpose of this work is to assess the impact of 
foreign mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on Italian acquired companies’ performance. 
The choice of the topic is motivated by the size and quality of the inbound cross-border 
M&A deals and by the rising “economic nationalism” in our country. In the last months, 
the extraordinary relevance of the foreign M&A phenomenon has been emphasized by 
the popular debate observed for the acquisitions of well-known brands like Versace and 
Candy, and by the peak in media attention due to the possible closure and relocation of a 
plant of an historical Italian confectionery manufacturer acquired by a Turkish group a 
few years ago. On the one hand, a huge segment of the population considers the massive 
acquisition of Italian jewels as a manifestation of the country's industrial decline and of 
the limits of the Italian economy. On the other hand, a large part of the public opinion 
sees optimistically the value recognized to the Made in Italy and the opportunities that 
foreign MNEs can provide to our domestic SMEs. 
In this work, we analyze the effects of cross-border M&As concluded between 2011 and 
2013 on acquired firms’ performance. Unlike many other previous studies, we include in 
our research both manufacturing and service firms (excluding financial services and real 
estate). Moreover, we considered only deals in which the foreign investors acquired a 
majority stake and were therefore potentially able to exercise control and define strategic 
decisions of the target.  
Evidence of “cherry picking” in Italy is provided by Barbaresco et al. (2018) and Benfra-
tello and Sembenelli (2006) while Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) find that foreign MNEs 
do not seem to systematically select lower or higher productive local target companies. 
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To account for the possibility that performance differences arise from the selection of 
best-performing firms rather than by the change in ownership, we employ the difference-
in-differences (DID) approach in conjunction with coarsened exact matching (CEM). To-
gether, these methods allow us to single out causal foreign ownership effects by focusing 
on the comparison between foreign-acquired firms (treated group) and remaining domes-
tic companies with a similar ex-ante likelihood of being acquired (control group).  
Our results suggest that foreign companies can manage domestic firms better than former 
local owners and managers. We find that foreign-acquired firms are more likely to out-
perform control units since they show a significant higher EBITDA margin and positive 
but not significant effects on sales and ROA. At the end of this empirical research, some 
advice to manager of foreign companies looking at domestic firms are suggested. 
CHAPTER 1. The M&A phenomenon in Italy is unprecedented both for size and quality 
of the deals. M&As announced in the first nine months of the year, suggest that 2018 is 
on track to become one of the most valuable years in a long time, at least in terms of 
number of transactions (KPMG, 2018). The first chapter describes the trends for global 
M&As, cross-border M&As, and inbound, outbound and domestic Italian deals. M&As 
trends in Italy (data from Zephyr-Bureau van Dijk) are illustrated and compared in terms 
of values and volumes, main sectors and main countries involved. The picture that 
emerges shows an evident disproportion between the inbound and outbound M&A market 
in our country.  
CHAPTER 2. The "Colonization Risk" is an actual and strategic theme of discussion in 
Italy. In the popular debate, foreign M&As of Italian companies have often been criticized 
by implying loss of national control and a negative effect on the economy and industrial 
system. Economic nationalism is rising in the country and in the European Union and 
these fears are testified by the increasing number of protectionist measures adopted. From 
the 2014 Spring PEW Global Attitude survey, it emerges that Italy is one of the countries 
most opposed to foreign investors. Just 23% of the Italians interviewed believe that for-
eign acquisition of domestic firms is beneficial while the others are opposed to FDI.  
Nevertheless, consistently with FDI theory, most of the literature argues that foreign 
MNEs may have the potential to develop the business of the local target company by 
bringing new capital from foreign countries (Barbaresco et al., 2018); giving access 
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opportunities to new markets or better access to its existing markets thanks to MNEs’ 
presence abroad (Chari et al., 2009; ICE & Prometeia, 2014); transferring management 
practices and superior technological know-how (Bertrand and Zitouna, 2008); bringing 
brand reputation and a higher bargaining power towards suppliers and customers (Bar-
baresco et al., 2018). On the other hand, literature also highlights that cross-border M&As 
can hide dangers and risks such as the closure of domestic manufacturing plants through 
their relocation abroad or the danger of profit stripping. 
CHAPTER 3. In this chapter, twenty-six studies that investigate the impact of cross-bor-
der M&As on the performance of the target firm are reviewed.  Empirical evidence on 
post-acquisition performance of acquired companies is mixed. However, most of the stud-
ies give no support to the worries that cross-border M&As may lead to performance de-
terioration.  
The bulk of the literature (18 papers) has analysed productivity (total factor productivity 
and labour productivity) effects. However, many studies investigate also the effects on 
profitability, efficiency, sales, employment levels, salaries, investments, exports, finan-
cial structure and probability of survival. All the 26 studies reviewed use data on manu-
facturing firms, with only a few including also services companies. Some papers investi-
gate if the effects of foreign acquisitions vary across industries (Fukao et al., 2006; Shiff-
bauera et al., 2017; Siedschlag et al., 2014) while others measure differences based on the 
acquirer’s country of origin (Chen, 2011) and national cultural distance (Barbaresco et 
al., 2018; Piscitello and Rabbiosi, 2005).  
Previous studies conducted in Italy adopt different methodological approaches to measure 
the effect of the foreign ownership on the target performance. Two studies combine pro-
pensity score matching (PSM) with difference-in-differences approach (Bentivogli and 
Mirenda, 2017; ICE and Prometeia, 2014).  One study calculates for each indicator a four 
years pre- and post-acquisition value, and after computing the difference both for the 
treated group and its benchmark, evaluates the significance using a t-test analysis (Bar-
baresco et al., 2018). Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) apply the GMM-system estima-
tor by controlling for potential endogeneity sources, while Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) 
run a linear regression model by including controlling variables. Four studies show the 
positive contribution of foreign ownership on target’s performance (Barbaresco et al., 
2018; Bentivogli and Mirenda, 2017; ICE & Prometeia, 2004; Piscitello and Rabbiosi, 
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2005) while one study does not find any significant effect (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 
2006). 
CHAPTER 4. Our analysis is based on firm-level data from Italy over the period from 
2008 until 2016. Since we want to measure the performance of the acquired companies 
three years before and three years after the takeover, we consider only the M&As con-
cluded between 2011 and 2013. The combination of M&As’ data from Thomson Reuters 
database and balance sheet data from BvD's AIDA, allows us to compare the effects of 
foreign ownership on the performance of acquired firms on an aggregate value and by 
differentiating for target size, industry, form of the deal and acquirer’s country of origin.  
Firstly, we show how our outcomes of interest change after the takeover for the treated 
units. By simply comparing the 3-years average sales for the target firms before and after 
the cross-border M&As, we can see an improvement of 1.07% in sales for the treated 
units (Table 17). The change is larger for SMEs, in the services industry or when the 
acquirer is non-European. Adopting the same approach, we note that return on assets 
(ROA) decrease by 0.79% in the post-acquisition period (Table 19), although the effects 
are better in case of SMEs, services sector or European acquirers. Similarly, EBITDA 
margin decreased by 3.63% after the deal (Table 21). The effects are worst in case of 
large companies, services industry, and acquisitions (rather than mergers). Nevertheless, 
the previous results are not useful if not analysed in comparison to what would have hap-
pened in case the acquired company had remained under domestic ownership.  
A major concern of the existing literature is the possibility of “selection bias” affecting 
the estimates of the impact of a foreign takeover on target performance. Often it is argued 
that firms acquired by foreign companies show better performance simply because for-
eign investors “cherry pick” the best performing local firms. If this is the case, a simple 
performance comparison between foreign-acquired and domestically-owned firms would 
lead to an overestimate of the real impact of the M&A. In order to address the potential 
selection bias problem and measure the causal effect of foreign acquisition, we adopt an 
empirical strategy that combine difference-in-differences with matching. However, con-
versely to Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) and ICE and Prometeia (2014) that combined 
DID with PSM, we adopt coarsened exact matching (CEM) that it is an intuitive method 
introduced by Iacus, King and Porro (2009) to improve the estimation of causal effects 
by reducing the differences in observable characteristics (in our case industry, sales, 
Executive Summary 
5 
ROA, EBITDA margin and debt on equity ratio) between treated and control groups. 
According to Iacus et al. (2012) CEM dominates commonly used existing matching meth-
ods (e.g. propensity score matching) in its ability to reduce imbalance, model dependence, 
estimation error, bias, variance, mean square error. 
After we matched treated with control units, we ran a first-difference regression on the 
matched sample finding that foreign-owned firms show a positive effect on EBITDA 
margin (95% level of significance), but no significant effects on sales and ROA. Con-
versely, Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) and ICE and Prometeia (2014) had shown a pos-
itive effect on sales growth after the M&A, while no previous literature in Italy has ana-
lysed ROA and EBITDA margin. 
Moreover, we find that performance effects are larger in the manufacturing industry ra-
ther than services, in SMEs rather than large companies, and in mergers rather than ac-
quisitions. Moreover, national cultural distance as defined by Ronen and Shenkar (2013) 
seems to be positively correlated to EBITDA margin. Conversely, the distinction based 
on the acquirer’s geographical distance (European vs non-European) does not show any 
significant effect. 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS. This work contributes to the international business litera-
ture by uncovering important characteristics related to foreign ownership advantages and 
providing important managerial implications for foreign companies that want to acquire 
Italian firms. Based on our results, we recommend that foreign acquirers must carefully 
plan the post-merger integration (PMI) process, especially in the services industry. This 
is because services companies have usually higher component of human capital and in-
tangible assets and they are more difficult to integrate than manufacturing firms. Moreo-
ver, our findings suggest that larger target companies can need more time to fully manifest 
the positive effects of foreign ownership while SMEs are more likely to benefit from the 
acquisition in the short term, as argued also by Sinani and Meyer (2004) and Thanos and 
Papadakis (2012). Managers must take in mind this aspect when evaluating possible 
M&A synergies. Furthermore, especially in case of acquisitions, foreign investors must 
be aware that trust and autonomy of the acquired firm’s members are two important ele-
ments of the PMI process and that tight controls tend to signal the absence of trust and 
can lead to a worsening of the performance. Acquirers should always find the correct 
balance between autonomy granted to the target company and set of rules, systems and 
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performance expectations, typically used to gain control (Datta and Grant, 1990). Finally, 
our results suggest that foreign investors should never underestimate national cultural 
differences, even if the acquirer and target country seem to be similar in many aspects. 
Operations in psychically close countries are not necessarily easy to manage, as suggested 
by the concept of “psychic distance paradox”, because assumptions of similarity can pre-
vent executives from learning about critical differences (O’Grady and Lane, 1996).  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. I would like to thank Prof. Diego Campagnolo, for his availa-
bility, teachings and brilliant food for thought, but also for having transmitted me his 
passion for the corporate strategy world and academic research. Furthermore, I would like 
to thank Prof. Marco Bertoni for his valuable advice and suggestions on the database 
construction and methodological part.   
 1. CHAPTER 
CROSS-BORDER M&AS: TRENDS, FACTS 
AND FIGURES 
1.1 Introduction 
Foreign merger and acquisitions (M&As) play an important role in the world economy. 
In the first part of the chapter, recent global trends concerning mergers and acquisitions 
in general and cross-border takeovers more specifically are briefly described. The topic 
is particularly relevant in this period, considering that the transactions announced in the 
first nine months of the year, suggest that 2018 is on track to becoming one of the most 
valuable years in a long time (KPMG, 2018). In the second part, we analyse data and facts 
about the Italian M&A market for the period 2008-2017. In particular, the trends of the 
Italian inbound, outbound1 and domestic M&As are illustrated and compared in terms of 
values and volumes, main sectors and main countries (target or acquiring) involved. 
The size of the phenomenon of foreign takeovers in the world motivate the analysis of 
the effects of foreign ownership on the host countries’ economies and, in particular, the 
empirical analysis testing the existence of a higher post-acquisition performance for for-
eign-controlled firms compared to domestically-owned ones. The topic is of interest for 
policy makers, as it could give empirical support to the implementation of policies to 
attract or discourage foreign companies to acquire local firms. Especially in Italy, the 
relevance of the cross-border M&A phenomenon has been emphasized in the last months 
by the peak of media attention observed for the acquisitions of well-known brands as 
Versace and Candy group, to name a few.  
                                                 
 
1Foreign takeovers can be divided in two types: inbound (or inward) cross-border M&As involve an inward 
capital movement due to the sale of a domestic company to a foreign investor; conversely, outbound (or 
outward) cross-border M&As involve outward capital movement due to purchase of a foreign company.   
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Unless otherwise stated in the text, the data and the statistics used in this chapter have 
been retrieved or calculated from the Zephyr database2 published by Bureau van Dijk.   
1.2 Global M&A trends 
1.2.1 Value and volume of M&A deals globally 
Global M&A activity in the first nine months of 2018 set a record in terms of deals value. 
Transactions for a total of $4,13 trillion have been announced in the first nine months of 
the year, representing one of the highest value years on record, except for 2015 ($4,3 
trillion) and 2007 ($4,4 trillion) (Zephir published by Bureau van Dijk, 2018). The total 
deal value has been bolstered by a series of mega-deals (i.e. takeovers worth more than 
$5 billion) such as the acquisition of Sky by Comcast. 
Focusing on the 2012 to 2017 trend, the volume and value of the global M&A market 
slightly declined in 2017 for the second year in a row (Figure 1). More than 96,000 deals 
were announced for a total value of $4,7 trillion, resulting in an 8 per cent drop compared 
to the previous year in terms of volume and a 3 per cent in terms of total deal value.  
Figure 1 Global deals by volume and value 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
                                                 
 
2 The Zephyr M&A database includes all the deals completed between 01/01/2009 and 31/12/2017. The 
following deal types are included: Acquisition, Capital increase, Institutional buy-out, Management buy-in, 
Management buy-out, Merger, Minority Stake. Deal types excluded are: joint ventures, IPOs, planned IPOs 
and share buybacks. 
3 Reference to “dollars” ($) means United States dollars, unless otherwise indicated. 
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Although the result represents the second consecutive annual decline by volume and 
value, it represents an improvement compared with 2012 and 2013 values. 
Despite the overall reduction of the global M&A market, in 2017 several world regions 
attracted more value than in 2016. For example, in Western Europe4 the total deal value 
climbed 6 per cent to $1,3 trillion. Similar improvements were registered also in the Far 
East and Central Asia. However, the United States is still holding the first position in 
terms of FDI attractiveness index in 2017, ranking first both in terms of deal volume 
(Figure 2) and value (Figure 3). Companies based in the US were targeted in almost 
21,000 deals for a combined value of about $1,5 trillion. Its nearest rival on both fronts 
was China, which placed second with almost 14,000 deals for a countervalue of $720 
billion. The UK ranked third, with about 6,000 deals worth $285 billion, followed by 
Germany in the fourth position with 4,500 deals worth $175 billion. Italy ranked 12th in 
terms of total deal value with $92 billion and 18th in terms of volume with 1,213 deals. 
Focusing on the most active sectors involved in M&A deals, the “machinery, equipment, 
furniture and recycling” sector topped the industry rankings both in terms of volume and 
value in 2017 with about 10,000 deals worth $569 billion. The “chemicals, rubber and  
Figure 2 Top five global target countries by deal volume in 2017 
 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
                                                 
 
4 The Western Europe region covers target companies in Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mon-
aco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. 
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Figure 3 Top five global target countries by deal value in 2017 
 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
plastics” industry ranked at the second place by value ($389 billion), placing it ahead of 
“banks” ($312 billion) and “primary sector” ($298 billion). 
Despite the decline in global M&A activity in 2017, a positive trend was recorded in 
terms of private equity and venture capital (PE and VC) investment that hit its highest 
value ($753 billion) since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2007.  
1.2.2 Cross-border deals 
In 2017 cross-border M&A activity accounted for about 30% of total M&A volume and 
cross-border deals decreased by 10% compared to 2016 (Thomson Reuters, 2017). On 
one side, outbound cross-border levels from acquirors based in the United States and in-
tra-Europe increased, but on the other side, the new measures put in place in China to 
curb foreign investments, resulted in a 35 per cent decline in outbound Chinese M&A 
activity compared to the record registered in 2016 (ibidem).  
Furthermore, as stated in the UNCTAD World Investment Report 20185, the value of net 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions decreased in 2017 compared to the previous year 
                                                 
 
5 All values and numbers referring to cross-border M&As in the UNCTAD 2018 report are presented on a 
net basis. Net cross-border M&As are calculated considering sales of companies in a host economy to for-
eign MNEs. It excludes sales of foreign affiliates (already owned by foreign MNEs) to other foreign MNEs. 
Divestments (sales of foreign affiliates to domestic firms) are subtracted from the value (number). Calcula-
tions for 2016 and 2017 net cross-border M&As are based on information reported by Thomson Reuters 
Eikon. For previous years, please see WIR17 and its web annex tables. 
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from $887 billion to $694 billion. This means that although total global M&A activity 
(both domestic and cross-border deals) has been robust over the past few years, the ag-
gregate value of net cross-border M&As contracted in 2017, after a significant rise year-
by-year since 2013. Conversely, the number of net cross-border M&A deals sustained its 
upward trend to almost 7,000 deals in 2017 (Figure 4). 
Figure 4 Value and number of net cross-border M&As 2008-2017 
 
  Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018; http://unctad.org/wir or http://unctad.org/fdistatistics. 
The value of net cross-border M&As in 2017 decreased in all the economic sectors com-
pared to 2016 (Table 1). The value of cross-border M&As in the primary sector decreased 
by 70 per cent, even if the number of transactions in the sector more than doubled. At the 
manufacturing level, the value decreased to $327 billion in 2017 with extractive indus-
tries, food and beverages sector, and electronics industry registering the largest decline. 
In contrast, the value of net transactions in machinery and equipment, business services 
and information and communication increased considerably compared to the previous 
year (UNCTAD, 2018). 
Table 1 Value and number of net cross-border M&As, by sector, 2013-2017 
 VALUE (BILLIONS OF US$) NUMBER 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
TOTAL   263   428   735   887   694 4 936 6 090 6 364 6 607 6 967 
PRIMAY -  13   37   34   83   24   379  341  240  206  550 
MANUFACTURING   135   188   394   406   327 1 440 1 694 1 778 1 745 1 690 
SERVICES   140   203   306   398   343 3 117 4 055 4 346 4 656 4 727 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018; http://unctad.org/wir or http://unctad.org/fdistatistics. 
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1.3 Italian M&A market 
1.3.1 Inbound Italian M&As 
In 2017 the inward Italian M&A activity substantially decreased. Firstly, in terms of deal 
volume the number of transactions (578 deals in 2017) halved compared to the previous 
year. It was a nadir not recorded since 2012 when the number of takeovers concluded was 
lower than 500. Secondly, the total deal value also decreased from a total of €67 billion 
to €43 billion (Figure 5). A decrease in the number of billionaire transactions contributed 
to the decrease in the total value since only five deals worth more than €1 billion were 
completed in 2017. 
Figure 5 Inbound Italian deals by volume and value 
 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
With respect to the Italian sectors more subject to foreign takeovers, in 2017 (Table 2) 
“banks” represented alone more than half of the Italian inbound M&A market for coun-
tervalue (€19.6 billion), followed by “machinery, equipment, furniture and recycling” 
(€4.5 billion) and by the “construction” sector ($3.7 billion). However, in terms of vol-
umes Table 3 shows that the sector that has totalled the highest number of transactions in 
2017 has been “machinery, equipment, furniture and recycling” with 101 deals, ahead of 
“banks” (50 deals) and “gas, water and electricity” (44 deals). Obviously, every year some 
billionaire deal influences the ranking of the most targeted sectors. In 2016, for example, 
“post and telecommunications” ranked first while in 2015 that position was held by 
“banks”. 
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Table 2 Inbound Italian target sectors by value 
TARGET SECTOR6 
2015 
(MIL EUR) 
2016 
(MIL EUR) 
2017 
(MIL EUR) 
Banks 17,882 8,736 19,623 
Other services 8,093 7,627 6,936 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 16,578 3,424 4,456 
Construction 1,980 1,709 3,658 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 851 2,259 1,693 
Wholesale & retail trade 5,998 4,858 1,674 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics 2,172 8,797 1,032 
Post and telecommunications 10,833 24,659 1,030 
Gas, water, electricity 11,547 1,234 867 
Food, beverages, tobacco 702 3,238 767 
Hotels & restaurants 731 281 464 
Insurance companies 1,661 1,199 363 
Publishing, printing 28 120 263 
Transport 866 780 48 
Primary sector 1,640 507 28 
Wood, cork, paper 83 289 27 
Metals & metal products 1,798 471 14 
Education, health 0 170 0 
Public administration and defence -0 0 0 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
Table 3 Inbound Italian target sectors by volume 
TARGET SECTOR 2015 2016 2017 
Other services  222 230 156 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 122 148 101 
Banks 111 339 50 
Gas, water, electricity 72 55 44 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 26 67 37 
Wholesale & retail trade 49 45 32 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics 45 58 31 
Post and telecommunications 34 81 26 
Construction 48 29 26 
Publishing, printing 21 21 21 
Food, beverages, tobacco  28 15 16 
Metals & metal products  20 11 13 
Education, health 2 4 8 
Transport 12 9 7 
Hotels & restaurants 13 17 6 
Insurance companies 10 32 5 
Primary sector 13 28 4 
Wood, cork, paper 8 7 2 
Public administration and defence 0 0 0 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
                                                 
 
6 The sector breakdown uses targets’ activities as defined to be ‘Major Sectors’ by Zephyr. 
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With respect to the acquirer’s country of origin, in Table 4 are listed the main foreign 
countries that have acquired domestic companies in 2017. French investors were the main 
acquirors of Italian firms in 2017 in terms of value (€6.7 billion), followed by companies 
based in the USA (€5.4 billion) and Chinese companies (€3.5 billion). Nevertheless, US 
acquirors were the most prolific in terms of number of transactions (Table 5) with a total 
of 72 inbound M&A deals followed by Norway (42 deals) and UK (36 deals). However, 
in terms of value, in 2016 the most active foreign investors were located in Luxembourg 
while in 2015 in The Netherlands. Conversely, in terms of volumes the United States have 
been the most active acquirers since 2015 to 2017. 
Table 4 Top 10 inbound Italian acquiror countries by value 
ACQUIROR COUNTRY 2015 
(MIL EUR) 
2016 
(MIL EUR) 
2017 
(MIL EUR) 
France 3.821 9.474 6.668 
US 10.659 8.513 5.450 
China 3.222 230 3.464 
Netherlands 12.132 191 3.005 
Germany 172 74 2.998 
Norway 8.963 1.226 2.992 
Luxembourg 192 22.570 1.041 
UK 6.142 5.671 1.004 
Spain 1.370 1.327 935 
Cayman Islands 27 173 400 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
Table 5 Top 10 inbound Italian acquiror countries by volume 
ACQUIROR COUNTRY 2015 2016 2017 
United States of America 97 238 72 
Norway 64 45 42 
United Kingdom 48 207 36 
Germany 26 24 31 
France 33 66 29 
Spain 12 15 19 
China 12 9 17 
Luxembourg 23 27 15 
Switzerland 53 31 13 
Netherlands 16 15 9 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
To conclude, Figure 6  gives a glimpse to the trends of the inbound Italian private equity 
and venture capital activity by value and volume. In 2017, the value of inbound Italian 
PE and VC investment reached the highest value recorded since 2006 with a total value 
of completed deals equal to €6 billion. Looking more closely at the PE and VC trends, in 
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2017 it was registered the third annual increase by value contrasted with the third consec-
utive yearly decline by volume to 45 deals, matching that recorded for 2013. French in-
vestors were the main inbound PE and VC acquirors by value after signing off deals worth 
€3 billion in 2017, though US companies led by volume with 13 inbound PE and VC 
deals compared to the 8 deals concluded by France. 
Figure 6 Inbound Italian private equity deals by volume and value 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
1.3.2 Outbound Italian M&As 
Outbound M&A activity is much smaller than inbound M&A activity in Italy. In Figure 
7 is shown the outbound M&A trend in terms of volume and value. In 2017, the number 
of outward foreign deals concluded by Italian investors fell back for the third consecutive 
year to 128 deals. Similarly, the total deal value slumped for the second successive period 
reaching the lowest level at €2.6 billion. This means that in 2017 there were Italian inves-
tors that “made shopping” abroad, but altogether they are worth only 40 per cent of what 
France alone has spent in Italy in the same period (€6,7 billion). 
However, it is worth noting that the continuing decline comes after a boom in the out-
bound Italian M&A market that had resulted in 171 deals in 2014 and a total deal value 
of almost €12 billion in 2015. The low value and volume registered in 2017 is in part the 
result of a lack of transactions worth more than €1 billion. Indeed, the largest completed 
outbound M&A transaction is worth €750 million, and it represents 28 per cent of the 
total outward Italian M&A market. 
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Figure 7 Outbound Italian deals by volume and value 
 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
With regard to the sectors, in 2017 (Table 6) the industries more targeted by Italian 
companies abroad by value were “gas, water and electricity” (€1.2 billion) that 
represented alone 45 per cent of the total outbound M&A market, followed by 
“machinery, equipment, furniture and recycling” (€345 million) and by the “primary 
sector” (€344 million). However, Table 7 shows that the gas, water and electricity sector 
was only the 7th sector in terms of number of deals concluded (6 deals). The three most 
targeted industries in terms of volume in 2017 were “machinery, equipment, furniture and 
recycling” with 24 deals, “wholesale and retail trade” with 17 deals and “publishing and 
printing” with 13 deals. 
Table 6 Outbound Italian target sectors by value  
TARGET SECTOR  
2015 
(MIL EUR) 
2016 
(MIL EUR) 
2017 
(MIL EUR) 
Gas, Water, Electricity 489 22 1.203 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 6.204 840 345 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 0 26 344 
Other services 251 608 269 
Hotels & restaurants 0 0 142 
Wholesale & retail trade 18 479 121 
Transport 802 112 79 
Food, beverages, tobacco 160 918 55 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 60 173 42 
Publishing, printing 400 41 35 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 1.298 10 1 
Metals & metal products 13 124 0 
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Insurance companies 1.961 5.494 0 
Education, Health 0 0 0 
Public administration and defence 0 0 0 
Construction 21 509 0 
Wood, cork, paper 179 6 0 
Banks 76 351 0 
Post and telecommunications 0 0 0 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
Table 7 Outbound Italian target sectors by volume 
TARGET SECTOR  2015 2016 2017 
Other services 44 42 28 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 22 27 24 
Wholesale & retail trade 15 19 17 
Publishing, printing 9 10 13 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 14 9 9 
Transport 4 3 7 
Gas, Water, Electricity 8 6 6 
Food, beverages, tobacco 10 3 3 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 7 6 3 
Insurance companies 3 1 2 
Wood, cork, paper 5 2 2 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 3 3 2 
Education, Health 0 0 2 
Construction 8 3 1 
Metals & metal products 8 7 1 
Hotels & restaurants 0 0 1 
Banks 2 2 0 
Public administration and defence 1 0 0 
Post and telecommunications 1 1 0 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
With regard to target countries, in 2017 France was the main target country by value with 
a total deal value equal to €815 million (Table 8), ahead of Spain with €589 million and 
Romania with €400 million. However, in terms of volume, France (10 deals) was over-
taken by the UK since Italian-based companies completed 18 deals in the UK (Table 9), 
though the combined value was only €81 million compared to the almost ten times higher 
value registered in France. 
In 2017, outbound PE and VC investment resulted in 24 deals for a total value of €247 
million (Figure 8). Outbound PE and VC investments brought an end to two consecutive 
annual increases in value. However, growth was not wholly stripped away as the value of 
the takeovers concluded in 2017 remained higher than the levels registered in 2015 and 
2014. Similarly, volume may have slipped yearly but, with the exception of 2016, in 2017 
PE and VC transactions have been the highest recorded since 2001. Canadian companies 
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Table 8 Top 10 outbound Italian target countries by value 
TARGET COUNTRY 2015 
(MIL EUR) 
2016 
(MIL EUR) 
2017 
(MIL EUR) 
France 848 337 815 
Spain 45 204 589 
Romania 1 95 400 
Canada 4 14 227 
United States of America 6.247 948 149 
Brazil 109 58 110 
Germany 1.365 252 99 
United Kingdom 480 278 81 
Greece 0 0 49 
Netherlands 1.246 1 35 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
Table 9 Top 10 outbound Italian target countries by volume 
TARGET COUNTRY 2015 2016 2017 
United Kingdom 15 17 18 
Spain 9 15 14 
United States of America 18 15 13 
France 15 11 10 
Germany 14 19 9 
Czech Republic 2 12 9 
Netherlands 4 4 7 
Switzerland 4 10 5 
Canada 4 3 3 
Hong Kong 0 0 3 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
Figure 8 Outbound Italian private equity deals by volume and value 
 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
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were the main targets of outbound Italian PE and VC investment by value with €85 mil-
lion, followed by Spain (€69 million) and the United States (€54 million). In terms of 
volume, PE and VC transactions targeted companies based mainly in the UK (7 deals) 
and Spain (6 deals). 
1.3.3 Domestic Italian M&As 
In 2017, the aggregate value of domestic Italian M&As fell by 31 per cent to €19 billion, 
compared to the €27 billion recorded the previous year (Figure 9). Volume also dropped 
from 642 deals in 2016 to 583 in 2017, the lowest result since 2010. This outcome marked 
the third consecutive annual decline in volume and the first in value after three consecu-
tive years of growth.   
Figure 9 Domestic Italian deals by volume and value 
 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
 “Banks” topped the sector rankings in 2017 (Table 10), with deals completed for €7.5 
billion, nearly half of which can be attributed to the acquisition of Banca Popolare di 
Milano by Banco BPM S.p.A. Other valuable sectors include “insurance companies” 
(€1.4 billion) and “machinery, equipment, furniture, and recycling” (€1.1 billion). In 
terms of volume. the sector (Table 11) that totalled the highest number of deals in 2017 
was “machinery, equipment, furniture and recycling” (69 deals) followed by “gas, water 
and electricity” (50 deals) and “publishing and printing” (37 deals). 
In line with the decline in the M&A activity, both the volume and value of domestic 
Italian PE and VC investments fell in 2017. 116 deals for a countervalue of €1.2 billion 
Cross-border M&As and performance: are Italian firms better off when acquired by foreign companies? 
20 
were concluded, compared to 125 transactions worth € 4.4 billion in the previous year. In 
terms of value, this outcome represents the worst result since 2010. The year’s top sector 
by value was “transport” worth €435 million, followed by “machinery, equipment, furni-
ture, and recycling” worth €151 million and “metals and metal products” worth € 82 mil-
lion.  
Table 10 Domestic Italian target sectors by value  
TARGET SECTOR  
2015 
(MIL EUR) 
2016 
(MIL EUR) 
2017 
(MIL EUR) 
Banks 1.134 6.194 7.514 
Other services 2.183 7.499 5.110 
Insurance companies 74 778 1.443 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 1.582 452 1.093 
Transport 851 1.648 1.003 
Gas, Water, Electricity 2.707 5.900 819 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 7.667 511 510 
Wholesale & retail trade 2.065 33 314 
Wood, cork, paper 0 20 313 
Construction 1.337 492 275 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 1 524 244 
Publishing, printing 148 1.625 181 
Post and telecommunications 39 923 161 
Metals & metal products 207 798 97 
Hotels & restaurants 34 23 62 
Food, beverages, tobacco 404 265 34 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 450 573 28 
Education, Health 1 0 4 
Public administration and defence 0 0 0 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
Table 11 Domestic Italian target sectors by volume 
TARGET SECTOR  2015 2016 2017 
Other services 322 248 196 
Machinery, equipment, furniture, recycling 78 70 69 
Gas, Water, Electricity 44 43 50 
Publishing, printing 31 48 37 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-metallic products 23 29 33 
Wholesale & retail trade 38 27 33 
Banks 26 34 26 
Food, beverages, tobacco 26 27 23 
Metals & metal products 20 19 20 
Transport 19 17 20 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 23 18 16 
Construction 19 18 14 
Insurance companies 3 24 13 
Primary Sector (agriculture, mining, etc.) 4 3 9 
Education, Health 79 1 8 
Hotels & restaurants 8 7 7 
Cross-border M&As: trends, facts and figures 
21 
Wood, cork, paper 2 3 5 
Post and telecommunications 6 6 4 
Public administration and defence 1 2 0 
Source: adapted from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
Figure 10 Domestic Italian Private equity deals by volume and value 
 
Source: Elaborations on data from Zephyr published by Bureau van Dijk 
1.4 Conclusions 
What emerges from the analysis of the Italian M&A market (Zephyr published by Bureau 
van Dijk) is the considerable disproportion between the inbound and outbound market. If 
on the one hand, in 2017 foreign companies concluded 578 deals in Italy for a value of 
€43 billion, on the other hand Italian investors concluded abroad 128 deals for a value of 
€2,6 billion. This disproportion is particularly evident in the comparison between Italy 
and other industrial countries. For example, in 2017 French investors acquired Italian 
companies for a value of €6,7 billion compared to the €815 million spent by Italian in-
vestors in France. Similarly, US investors concluded 72 deals in Italy worth €5,4 billion 
compared to 13 deals worth €149 million concluded by Italian investors in the US.  
The high number of inbound cross-border M&As in Italy can be explained by the success 
of Italian products on foreign markets, the effect of the recognition of the qualitative and 
technical value of the Made in Italy, the pull capacity of the brands rather than the push 
capacity of the commercial channels and the undisputed design and productive know-
how in our territory. The result is a sui generis process whereby success on foreign mar-
kets ends up leading to acquisitions by foreign investors or, to put it another way, leads 
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from the export of products to the sale of companies (Barbaresco et al., 2018). Consider-
ing the relevance of the topic, we think that Italy is called to investigate the composite 
effects that foreign M&As can have on its economy, industry and on the performance and 
survival probabilities of the local companies acquired. 
 2. CHAPTER  
FOREIGN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND 
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM 
2.1 Introduction 
The topic of inbound cross-border M&As is particularly relevant in Italy, considering 
both the dimension of the phenomenon analysed in the previous chapter and the effects 
that foreign ownership can have on the Italian economy and on the acquired companies’ 
performance. If on the one hand, cross-border M&As are considered a great accelerator 
for the economic growth of the target country, on the other hand they are perceived also 
as a source of political risk, foreign influence and strategic dependence (Ourvoie, 2016). 
The risks mentioned above are often referred using the term “national interest” in the 
M&A literature. However, it is difficult to find a precise definition of “national interest”, 
which is a discretionary term deliberately left vague to allow the rejection of foreign take-
overs consider contrary to it. What interests should the government protect and prioritize? 
If on the one hand the topic of national security is surely important, equally important 
should be the theme of performance and survival of the domestic-acquired companies. 
Are domestic companies better off when acquired by foreign investors? Or the alternative 
to foreign acquisition is the exit from the market because of the increasing global compe-
tition of MNEs? 
In this chapter, firstly we document how the economic nationalism is rising in Italy and 
in the European Union because of the increasing number of protectionist measures 
adopted. Then, we show how the public opinion has reacted to cross-border deals during 
the last years, through a review of some articles of the most popular national and interna-
tional newspapers (e.g. Il sole 24 ore, Financial Times) and through the Spring PEW 
Global Attitude survey. Then, we analyse the reasons why the relationship between cross-
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border M&As and national interest is ambivalent, with a particular focus on the perspec-
tive of the target country. Finally, since the focus of this study is to analyse the post-
acquisition performance of the target firms, we summarise the risks and opportunities that 
domestic target companies face due to cross-border deals. 
2.2 The rise of “economic nationalism” 
2.2.1 Definition of “economic nationalism" 
Foreign takeovers are an important part of the global economy. On the one hand, large 
firms can enter into a new market through the acquisition of a local firm. On the other 
hand, if there is excess capacity in an industry, weak firms can leave the market by being 
acquired by another company instead of filing for bankruptcy. In addition, when cross-
border mergers and acquisitions take place, national economies become more integrated 
and this increasing integration among countries rise several concerns. Sometimes govern-
ments react negatively to takeover bids motivated by concerns different from anti-com-
petition reasons as when nationalist actions seem to be motivated by the ‘nationality’ of 
the bidder.  
All measures politicians implement to prevent inbound foreign acquisitions give rise to 
the so-called “economic nationalism”, term broadly used to refer to the preference for 
natives over foreign investors in economic activities. Dinc and Erel (2013) show that na-
tionalist actions are more frequent where and when preferences7 for natives against for-
eigners are stronger in both social and economic dimensions. Additionally, nationalist 
reactions are stronger in case of weak governments and against countries for which the 
public opinion in the target country has little trust or affinity (ibidem). Conversely, no 
significant effect was found for variables like GDP growth, unemployment, or the target 
country prime minister’s ideology (ibidem). 
Nationalist measures by domestic governments do not just take form as opposition to 
foreign investors. Dinc and Erel (2013), reviewing most common methods used by indi-
vidual countries in implementing their nationalist policies in issues related to foreign take-
overs, provide a list of methods that are often used simultaneously: 
                                                 
 
7 Dinc and Erel (2013) measure the importance of such preferences both by survey evidence and by the 
vote share of extreme right parties, for which preference for the native and against the foreigner is a defining 
issue in Europe. 
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• Public interest: the EU Merger Regulation allows domestic governments to oppose a 
merger or an acquisition in order to protect the domestic country’s national interests. 
• Moral persuasion: this practice is especially common when policy makers try to stop 
a foreign takeover of a domestic firm at the rumour stage by simply stating that they 
are against it. Although governments may have no legal power to stop the takeover, 
the implicit threat that the acquirer will deal with a hostile domestic government if 
the acquisition goes through could be a deterrent powerful enough to not invest any-
more. This implicit threat is still more strong if the government is also a major cus-
tomer of the target or acquiring company, as for example can happen in the pharma-
ceutical sector.  
• Golden shares: in many privatized companies, domestic governments still hold 
“golden shares” or the right to veto important corporate changes (e.g. the decision to 
merge or to be acquired by a foreign company). 
• Prudential rules for financial companies: the EU’s Merger Regulation allows gov-
ernments to oppose to the acquisition of a bank on the basis of prudential rules.  
• Playing for time: since any delay or uncertainty represents often a disadvantage for 
the potential acquirer, this method allows the domestic government to find and/or 
fund a friendly bidder for the target firm. For example, policy makers can gain time 
thanks to the requirements that the stock market regulator need to approve any tender 
offer or through the approvals necessary from different commissions, such as energy 
boards to clear potential mergers and acquisitions.  
• Providing financing to domestic bidders: local governments can support domestic 
bidders by providing funds to complete the acquisition. Nevertheless, direct aid from 
the government budget is not so common while it is more frequent that public pension 
funds and government-owned banks lend to the bidder and/or invest in the combined 
company.  
• Finding “white knights”: this is one of the most effective methods to block an un-
wanted foreign takeover. While adopting other methods to gain time, the policy mak-
ers and/or the target managers look for a friendly acquirer (i.e. “white knight”) or a 
friendly blocking minority holder (i.e. “white squire”).  
• Creating “National Champions”: since target size is often a good deterrent for cross-
border acquisitions, this protectionist action involves supporting the merger of two 
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domestic companies with the goal of creating a new company that is “too big to be 
taken over” by a foreign acquirer.  
2.2.2 New anti-takeover measures in Italy and Europe 
The pressures of foreign investors have engendered the responses of developed countries’ 
governments, who have both welcomed and resisted intrusions on national sovereignty 
according to their national implications. As stated in the 2018 UNCTAD World Invest-
ment report, last year 65 countries adopted 126 changes in national investment policies 
of which 93 liberalized, encouraged or facilitated investment, 18 introduced restrictions 
or regulations and the remaining 15 were neutral. Despite the 2017 global trend in favour 
of liberalization with numerous countries promoting investment by simplifying adminis-
trative procedures or providing incentives, the share of restrictive and regulatory invest-
ment policy measures increased significantly in the last months. From October 2017 to 
April 2018, about 30 per cent of new investment measures were of a restrictive or regu-
latory nature (UNCTAD, 2018). This means that some countries are taking a more critical 
stance towards cross-border deals, particularly when they relate on matters such as public 
order, national security, local producers’ competitiveness, foreign ownership of land and 
natural resources and the sale of strategic domestic assets and technology firms.  
In October 2017, the Italian Government approved the law decree n. 148/2017 to protect 
companies from hostile takeovers after French media group Vivendi sharply increased its 
holding in broadcasting firm Mediaset and Telecom Italia. The new rules on takeovers 
signals protectionist sentiment is on the rise in Italy after years of relatively open approach 
to foreign acquisitions which French companies in particular, have taken advantage of 
(Vagnoni, 2017). An event that contributed to inflame economic nationalism and the anti-
French feeling in Italy was last year move of the French President Macron to block the 
acquisition of the French shipyard Stx by the Italian Fincantieri, even if subsequently Mr 
Macron did a U-turn on his initial decision. The aforementioned decree introduced new 
provisions on disclosure requirements on stakes detained in Italian listed companies and 
it extended the government’s so-called “golden powers” to block takeovers by non-EU 
companies to high technology sectors. Exactly, foreign investors acquiring a stake ex-
ceeding 10 per cent of the target’s voting capital are now required to render a statement 
disclosing their goals for the forthcoming six months specifying: 
• how the acquisition will be financed;  
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• whether they are acting alone or in agreement with other investors; 
• whether they plan to acquire additional stakes in the company, take over the control 
or influence the management of the company, and its strategy; 
• their intentions in respect of shareholders agreement they are party to; 
• whether they intend to propose to increase or revoke members of the board of direc-
tors or board of statutory auditors. 
Breaches of the disclosure obligations trigger relevant administrative and pecuniary sanc-
tions (and in extreme circumstances of market manipulation, criminal sanctions) as well 
as freezing of the voting rights concerning the relevant stake. These new requirements are 
intended to guarantee the transparency of the market and allow target companies to react 
against hostile takeovers. The Italian Government has a veto right to stop investments in 
the defence and national security sector and in networks, plants, assets and relationships 
deemed strategic for the national interest in the fields of energy, transportation and com-
munications. The Decree has broadened the Government’s golden powers by extension 
to “highly intensive technology” services and assets and they could be exercised also in 
case of danger for the national security and public order. This entails a higher discretion 
by the Government in the evaluation of the situation that may trigger the golden powers 
enforcement. 
In a statement after the cabinet meeting the Minister of Economic Development declared: 
“Italy is a country that is open to international investments, but it demands 
that investors respect the rules and we safeguard our national interests like 
all the world’s large economies,” [Carlo Calenda, Minister of the Economic 
Development in 2017 (as cited in Vagnoni, 2017)]. 
Italy is not the only country that has discussed additional ways and means to strengthen 
investment screening mechanisms.  
In July 2017, Germany was the first European Union country to tighten its rules concern-
ing cross-border deals as a reaction to the acquisition of Kuka, the Germany’s largest 
maker of industrial robotics, by the Chinese appliance maker Midea (Chazan, 2017). The 
acquisition raised fears about Germany technical expertise ending up in Chinese hands, 
so that the government approved a measure to make it easier for the state to ward off 
foreign takeovers that could endanger the country’s control on its more strategic indus-
tries and to protect also software firms that work with banks, airports and hospitals, man-
aging cloud data or telecommunications (Hall, 2017).  
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In 2018, the Government of the United Kingdom published a white paper on national 
security and investment to better scrutiny foreign takeovers (Pickard, 2018). With the new 
proposal, sellers will be expected to notify the authorities when they sell more than 50 
per cent of one asset or more than 25 per cent of shares in their company and both sellers 
and bidders will be encouraged to inform the government on a voluntary basis about every 
transaction that could give rise to security risks (Pickard, 2018).  
The French government is currently discussing a proposal that aims to preserve FDI and 
at the same time to prevent its technology falling into the hands of foreign powers like 
China and the United States. In the proposed anti-takeover legislation that is expected to 
be approved by a majority in parliament when it comes to vote in early 2019, President 
Emmanuel Macron’s government is proposing to widen the scope for state intervention 
and substantially increase the use of “golden shares” to protect national interests (Rose-
main, Barzic & Rose, 2018). The move comes after several national champions such as 
train-maker Alstom and telecoms equipment maker Alcatel-Lucent changed flags in re-
cent years under deals that many prominent political deemed unfair and detrimental for 
the country. In July 2017 the President Macron, that is a former investment banker and 
advocate of free trade, has already shown willingness to ward off foreign takeovers when 
national interests may be at stake, temporarily nationalizing French shipyard STX to pre-
vent it falling into Italian hands (although he later approved its acquisition by Italy’s Fin-
cantieri).  
In addition to their own national initiatives, the protectionist debate led Germany, France 
and Italy to call for a Europe-wide mechanism for more rigorous examination of foreign 
takeovers (Alderman, 2018). The president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, in September 2017 proposed to create a framework to screen cross-border deals 
(Rosemain, Barzic & Rose, 2018). Thanks to this measure the EU governments would 
have the power to block Chinese and other foreign takeovers even if they were carried 
out via European shell companies (Brunsden, 2017). 
According to the text of the European Commission proposal8, while the EU does not want 
to change its openness to FDI, it wants to set up “vigorous and effective policies to, on 
the one hand, open up other economies and ensure that everyone plays by the same rules, 
                                                 
 
8 Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of the council establishing a framework for 
screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union, COM(17) 487 final. 
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and, on the other hand, to protect critical European assets against investment that would 
be detrimental to legitimate interests of the Union or its Member States”. The objective 
of the draft regulation is to establish a framework for the Member States, and in certain 
cases the Commission, to screen foreign direct investments in the European Union, while 
allowing Member States to take into account their individual situations and national fac-
tors. The framework would require governments to share information on sensitive takeo-
vers with each other and with Brussels, and to say which acquisitions they intend to 
screen.  The commission would be able to give a non-binding opinion if it felt a takeover 
is “likely to affect security or public order in one or more Member States” (ibidem). Alt-
hough, Brussels’ position on such deals would still be non-binding, “the Member States 
concerned shall take utmost account of the Commission's opinion and provide an expla-
nation to the Commission in case its opinion is not followed” (ibidem). 
In addition, under the proposals the Commission should be able to issue an advisory opin-
ion to the Member States concerned if it considers that FDI may affect security or public 
order in relation to projects or programmes of Union interest, such as Galileo, Horizon 
2020, Ten-T or Ten-E.  
2.3 The ambivalent relation between foreign takeovers and national 
interest  
2.3.1 Historical brands in foreign hands 
The "Colonization Risk" is an actual and strategic theme of discussion in Italy. After the 
financial crisis, Italy has been a land of raids and the share of foreign ownerships in the 
total population of firms has considerably grown. As a target country, Italy has witnessed 
a rapid increase in inward FDI, mainly through M&As. 5866 deals9 were concluded from 
January 2010 to December 2017, for a value of almost €400 billion (Zephir published by 
Bureau van Dijk, 2017b). These data testify that Made in Italy appeals to foreign inves-
tors, as evidenced also by the climb of three positions that Italy obtained in the 2018 A.T. 
Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index where the country ranked 10th 
(Figure 11).  
                                                 
 
9 Deal types included are: Acquisition, Capital increase, Institutional buy-out, Management buy-in, Manage-
ment buy-out, Merger, Minority Stake. Deal types excluded are: joint ventures, IPOs, planned IPOs and 
share buybacks. 
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Figure 11 2018 A.T. Kearney FDI Confidence Index 
 
Note: values are calculated on a 0 to 3 scale, with 3 being the highest level of confidence in a market as a future destination 
for FDI. 
Source: A.T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index (2018) 
According to Resciniti et al. (2015), Italian medium-sized firms appeal to foreign inves-
tors, because the gap between their positive performances and their small size (and capi-
tals) make their acquisition particularly convenient. 
Well-known former Italian-owned firms have changed ownership and are currently for-
eign-owned. According to Guido Nola, co-senior country office at JP Morgan Italy, there 
is not a single sector that is not appealing to foreign investors (Romei, 2016). The fashion 
and luxury sector, for example, is dominated by the acquisitions of the French groups 
Lvmh and Kering: the first detains Fendi (1999), Pucci (2000), Bulgari (2001), Loro Piana 
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(2013) and the historic Milanese pastry shop Cova (2013) while the latter detains, among 
the others, Gucci (2004) and Bottega Veneta (2013). Moreover, Versace was acquired by 
the US Michael Kors (2018), Pal Zileri and Valentino were acquired by the Qatari royal 
family's investment fund Mayhoola for Investments respectively in 2014 and 2012 and 
Krizia was acquired by the Chinese Shenzhen Marisfrolg Fashion  in 2014.  
In the food and beverage sector the situation does not differ. Campari sold Freeza (that 
include the brand Lemonsoda) to the Danish Royal Unibrew (2017); the Japanese Asahi 
acquired Peroni (2016) that actually was already in foreign hands; the Anglo-Dutch group 
Unilever acquired the premium ice-cream brand Grom (2015) and the Turkish group 
Toksoz acquired Pernigotti (2013).  
In the household appliances sector, after the acquisition of Candy by the Chinese multi-
national Haier in 2018 and the acquisition of Indesit by the US Whirpool in 2015, Italy 
has lost the last two Italian manufacturers of home appliances.  
Within other manufacturing sectors, well-known former Italian-owned firms that are cur-
rently foreign-owned include Atala, Ducati, Edison, Gruppo Ferretti, Italecementi Italo-
Ntv, Lamborghini, Pirelli and Poltrona Frau, to name a few. Football, national pride, lost 
the tricolour passport too: top soccer clubs as AC Milan and FC Internazionale Milano 
are now in Chinese hands while AS Roma is American. 
Even if a traveller obviously does not realise if Italo Ntv is Italian or American as long as 
the trains work the same as before, the loss of national-owned companies can entail sev-
eral risks in terms of social, economic and political costs for the local government. Having 
too many “Italo” entails the risk of creating a nation of consumers where companies are 
all foreign-owned. The government has the duty to intervene on the rules governing in-
vestments to manage risks and distortions of a mass landing of foreign investors and pol-
icy makers should ensure that investors take into consideration the interests of the country 
and the citizens, since the "power" and the strategic decisions could be taken elsewhere 
after the acquisition and profits, if any, could go abroad. 
Looking at the high-profile companies sold to foreign investors, Il Sole 24 Ore rose the 
following question: “Analysing the massive cross-border M&A phenomenon, is the real 
risk the predilection of foreign investors for healthy companies and solid assets and the 
possibility that they buy the best Italian jewels, leaving everything else adrift?” (Filippetti, 
2018). In the literature this process is called “cherry picking” approach as opposed to the 
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“lemon picking” approach, to indicate the case when foreign MNEs choose “preys” with 
the best performances rather than distressed firms. According to this view, the acquisition 
purpose is not so much a matter of restructuring firms in crisis, as to control firms already 
well-structured, both on a commercial and managerial level, and sometimes even finan-
cially solid (Resciniti et al., 2015).  
In chapter 3, analysing the existing literature on the topic we will try to answer to the 
following questions: What kind of targets do foreign companies prefer within the Italian 
economy? Do they pick the best-performing “cherries”, the underperforming “lemons” 
or both? Moreover, as we will see, when evaluating the causality of foreign ownership, a 
comparison of foreign-controlled firms with a domestically-owned control group may 
suffer from a selection bias. This selection problem arises since the takeover decision is 
not random but can depend on several variables like for example industry, profitability, 
productivity or intangible assets. Several recent studies adopt specific statistical tech-
niques that we will discuss later to cope with this problem. 
2.3.2 Mixed feelings in the public opinion 
Looking at the general’s public opinion, the 2014 Spring PEW Global Attitude survey 
measures and compares the views of foreign investment in advanced, emerging and de-
veloping countries and the perception people have about inbound foreign acquisitions. 
From the survey on a sample of over 48,000 people in 44 countries, two opposite blocks 
emerged regarding the subject of FDI. A global median of 74% approve greenfield in-
vestments, because these can mean new jobs and greater economic activity. But people 
are divided (45% good, 47% bad) about inward cross-border acquisitions, which can in-
volve a new management, a new business culture and possible company consolidation 
resulting in job losses. In particular, in developing countries 57% of people say inward 
foreign acquisitions are a good thing, followed by emerging markets (44%) and advanced 
economies (31%). African countries are the most supportive of foreigners investing in 
their economies and roughly half or more hold the view that inward foreign M&As are 
beneficial. The Germans and Japanese are among the most opposed to foreigners invest-
ing in their countries despite the fact that the two countries are two of the largest suppliers 
of outward investment flows: 79% of Germans and 76% of Japanese say foreign takeo-
vers of national companies are bad for the local economy. Along with Germany and Ja-
pan, Italy is one of the countries most opposed to foreign investors too. Just 23% of the 
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Italians interviewed believe that foreign acquisition of domestic firms is beneficial while 
the others are opposed to FDI. 
In the Italian debate about the effects of cross-border M&As on the national industrial 
system, the observers place themselves between two opposing extreme visions. On the 
one hand, there is who sees optimistically the value recognized to the Made in Italy and 
to the manufacturing traditions and technical and creative skills that permeate the Italian 
industrial system, witnessed also by the high EBITDA multiple that characterized several 
foreign takeovers. According to the optimistic supporters of this vision, the high counter-
values of the foreign business disposals feed the trust in the interest of the acquiring com-
panies to preserve on the territory the production (especially the high-quality one) and to 
confirm the management if it has proved to be successful. Barbaresco et al. (2018) claims 
that Italy needs FDI and that their lack would have worse effects than the sales of domes-
tic firms, in an industrial system financially asphyxiated by the under-capitalization of 
SMEs and by the too much indebted public budget.  
On the other hand, there is a huge segment of the population who consider the massive 
acquisition of Italian jewels as a manifestation of the country's industrial decline and as a 
demonstration of the limits of the Italian system. They emphasize the contrast between 
the entrepreneurial and industrial quality of the Made in Italy recognized worldwide and 
the lack of teamwork able to value the best productions through “sector poles”10, for ex-
ample around national champions in the leading-edge sectors (ibidem). Instead, the few 
historical MNEs able to compete on the global markets and remained under Italian hands 
(e.g. Luxottica, Barilla, Ferrero, Prada) act mainly individually and often move abroad 
the administrative and legal addresses since the costs of running a business in Italy are 
too high and undermine their competitiveness with other foreign companies in the same 
sector. According to this negative vision, the inbound FDI in Italy are not due to the 
Country’s attractiveness11, that should be founded on the better conditions comparatively 
offered to the investors, but it rather depends on the national weaknesses to create alter-
natives. These weaknesses are caused by the scarce relationships among companies and 
                                                 
 
10 As was the case, for example, for the big fashion groups in France, automotive in Germany, food and 
entertainment in USA, finance and insurance in UK, namely all the Coutnries able to attract lots of invest-
ments in that sectors. 
11 According to the 2018 World Bank’s “ease doing business" rank, Italy occupies the 46th position, that 
goes down to the 66th position for the specific voice “starting a business”, 105th for the voice “getting credit” 
and 112th for the voice “paying taxes”. 
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among companies and governments that would be useful to “anticipate the open market”, 
and by a certain reluctance of the domestic capitalism to invest and risk (ibidem). 
2.3.3 Italian companies: preys and predators 
Data from the Zephyr database published by Bureau van Dijk (2017b), show that there is 
a considerable disproportion between the inbound and the outbound M&A market in It-
aly, as already mentioned in chapter 1. In fact, the $2.6 billion spent in 2017 (128 deals) 
by local companies abroad seem to be very little compared to the approximately $43 bil-
lion (578 deals) invested by foreigners to grab the best of Made in Italy. 
Additionally, foreign multinational companies usually “make noise” on the public Italian 
press when they buy Italian brands, as argued by the report “Italia Multinazionale 2017” 
promoted by ICE (Mariotti & Mutinelli). 
On the other side, Italian companies “make less noise” when entering foreign markets 
usually through smaller acquisitions and participations, joint ventures or other agree-
ments. Unfortunately, the major Italian companies that invest abroad include the big mul-
tinational companies, which are only a fraction of the national industrial system. 
Nevertheless, according to the President of the ICE Agency Michele Scannavini, Italy is 
less prey for foreigners than we think since large international investors are attracted by 
“Made in Italy” but they are often chasing big deals and Italy is mainly composed by 
familiar and undercapitalized SMEs (Cavestri, 2017). The results of the research "Le 
aziende italiane alla conquista dei mercati esteri" conducted by the University of Padova-
CMR and HSBC bank in 2018 (as cited in Carnevale, 2018), show that only 13% of large 
Italian companies were acquired by foreign investors. The research beats the cliché ac-
cording to which there will be no more Italian companies because they will be all acquired 
by foreign investors. The cliché is incomplete and misleading also because over 40 per 
cent of the 800 medium and large interviewed Italian firms made at least an acquisition 
and, Italian companies acquired foreign targets in 81 per cent of the cases (ibidem). Well-
known transactions include but are not limited to the acquisition of the Nestlè candy busi-
ness in the US by Ferrero (2018), the acquisition of the Brazilian Eletropaulo by Enel 
(2018), the acquisition of the French shipyard Stx by Fincantieri (2017), of PartnerRe by 
Exor (2016), Grand Marnier by Campari (2016) and Carte Noire by Lavazza (2016).  
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2.4 Risks and opportunities for the target companies 
In a “macro” perspective, the effects of cross-border acquisitions can be very relevant for 
the target country’s economy and industrial system. Besides the problems concerning the 
national security, foreign influence and strategic dependence, equally relevant for policy 
makers should be the effects of cross-border M&As on target firms. The existing literature 
that estimate the performance of the firms acquired by foreign companies show con-
trasting results. On one hand, consistently with FDI theory, most of the literature argue 
that MNEs may have the potential to develop the business of the target by: 
• Bringing new capital from foreign markets (Barbaresco et al., 2018); 
• Giving access opportunities to new markets or better access to its existing markets 
(Chari et al., 2009; ICE & Prometeia, 2014), thanks to MNEs’ presence abroad. Spe-
cifically, considering the relatively small size of Italian manufacturing firms, “Made 
in Italy” products can particularly benefit from their inclusion in the MNEs’ wider 
portfolio of products and services, distribution channels and global network, espe-
cially when it comes to attractive but less accessible markets; 
• Transferring management practices and superior technological know-how. The trans-
fer of these capabilities can enhance the performance of the target firm through a sort 
of “disciplinary” effect which can improve or eliminate management inefficiencies 
in the acquired firm, or increase their productivity, R&D investments, workers’ 
wages and export capacity (Bertrand and Zitouna, 2008); 
• Bringing brand reputation (Barbaresco et al., 2018) and a higher bargaining power 
towards suppliers and customers, thanks to the new owner’s better market potential, 
which can turn useful in trade relations also in terms of payment periods. 
On the other hand, literature also highlight the dangers and risks that cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions hide and the detrimental effect these risks can provoke on target firms’ 
performance. 
The impact on employment, for example, is ambiguous. There are some studies that doc-
ument positive effects on the employment levels after the acquisition (Arnold and 
Javorcik, 2009) and others (Chen et al., 2011) that provide evidence of a decline of the 
labour demand due to a more efficient use of the workforce and to the improvement of 
the labour productivity. Ourvoie (2016) point out that if strategic decisions are not taken 
in the domestic country after the acquisition, cutbacks in employment levels could result 
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since foreign managements would probably be more focus on performance than on hu-
man-related elements, especially if the expected synergies do not materialize. Beyond the 
risk of potential job losses for the motivations illustrated before, the target country faces 
the risk of closing or marginalizing domestic manufacturing plants through their reloca-
tion abroad, mostly to areas with low cost of labour and other production factors (Resciniti 
et al., 2015) and the risk of finding itself with an impoverished national industrial herit-
age, in cases acquired firms, fully integrated by the acquirer, “disappear” as autonomous 
entity immediately or in a few years (Bodner & Capron, 2018). The possibility of becom-
ing mere branches of foreign groups, hides also the danger of profit stripping, as very 
often the profits of local subsidiaries are transferred to the headquarter or used to com-
pensate losses incurred in other subsidiaries of the group (Hopkins, 1999). From an eco-
nomical point of view, consideration should be given to the risk that foreign acquisitions 
impoverish the local supply chains because of the replacement of suppliers, local partners 
and funding banks with foreign ones (Barbaresco et al., 2018) while from a cultural point 
of view, to the risk of weakening the entrepreneurial spirit in the national economy in the 
event that family members do not keep their roles in the company or whenever foreign 
capitals are simply reinvested by the former family owners in non-productive assets and 
not entirely in new businesses (Resciniti et al., 2015). 
For all the aforementioned reasons, even if takeovers are friendly and can generate posi-
tive effects on the performance of the acquired domestic company, they may attract the 
attention of the governments that may obstruct the takeover (Morresi and Pezzi, 2014). 
2.5 Conclusions 
Foreign shopping in Italy is a relevant topic of discussion in the country and the cross-
border M&A phenomenon will surely continue to be relevant for at least three reasons. 
Firstly, capitals of the Italian system are limited and inadequate to compete on the global 
markets and the country needs foreign investments. Secondly, foreign MNEs recognise 
the value of the Italian brands as well as the technical and creative skills of the Italian 
industrial system. Thirdly, there is a mountain of liquidity around the World since it is 
calculated that private equity funds have $1,000 billion uninvested cash (Mittleman, 
2017).  
Surely, “national interest” is an important topic of discussion and it should be considered 
by the government in its choices related to cross-border M&As. Nevertheless, policy 
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makers and the public opinion should reflect also on other fundamental question for the 
future of the Italian industry. Do foreign acquisitions increase the performance of domes-
tic firms through their inclusion into a multinational group that could improve their man-
agement, elevate their operational scale and enhance their market power? Do foreign-
owned companies outperform local firms that in the acquisition year had the same prob-
ability of being a target but that have remained in Italian hands? Is the foreign acquisition 
a necessary step to guarantee the survival and the success of the target company? In the 
next two chapters we will face these arguments firstly reviewing the existing literature on 
the topic and then by conducting an empirical analysis on the Italian market. 
 3. CHAPTER  
FOREIGN M&AS AND PERFORMANCE 
EFFECTS ON THE LOCAL TARGET COMPANY: 
THE STATE OF THE ART 
3.1 Introduction 
The existing literature on M&A post-acquisition performance has explored the effects of 
foreign takeovers on the different stakeholders involved. Researchers have analysed, for 
example, the effects on the host country competitiveness, the repercussions on the perfor-
mance of the acquiring, the acquired and the combined firm and have documented the 
wealth effects for both the acquiring and the acquired firms’ shareholders. In all the cases, 
results are mixed. 
In this chapter, we review the main contributions on the topic of post-acquisition perfor-
mance of domestic firms acquired in cross-border M&As. How do local firms perform 
after being acquired by a foreign company? Do they outperform domestically-owned 
firms, based on the ownership advantages of the MNE, or underperform them, owing to 
inherent “liabilities of foreignness” (Hymer, 1976)? These conflicting hypotheses regard-
ing foreign subsidiary post-entry performance have stimulated numerous empirical stud-
ies that has shown different results. We summarise the main results that the literature has 
observed in terms of productivity, profitability, employment, financial structure, and 
other relevant variables after the takeover and if in general foreign ownership is associ-
ated with a competitive advantage. Twenty-six studies, mainly from influential interna-
tional business and economics journals, have been reviewed and summarized, with par-
ticular emphasis on the strategic implications related to the cross-border M&As. 
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3.2 Relevant empirical literature 
One of the most debated questions raised by the international business literature is 
whether firms acquired by foreign companies outperform domestically-owned firms with 
comparable pre-acquisition probability of becoming a foreign takeover target. A large 
number of contributions tried to answer this question with mixed results.  
According to the ‘internalization theory’ (e.g. Dunning, 1980), acquired companies would 
enjoy higher productivity compared to their domestic counterparts because of the transfer 
from the acquiring company of a well-established brand name, superior technological 
knowledge and managerial know-how. However, empirical evidence on post-acquisition 
performance of the target firm is inconsistent: while some research findings support the 
expectations of the ‘internalization theory’ (Buckley et al., 2002; Chang et al., 2013), 
others are more sceptical on the positive effects that such theory generally attributes to 
foreign M&As (Schiffbauer et al., 2017). 
In order to summarize the state of the art on the topic of post-acquisition performance of 
target firms, we have reviewed twenty-six studies that investigate the impact of cross-
border M&As on the performance of the target firm. The studies are different in terms of 
acquiring and target countries analysed, industries, other characteristics of both target and 
acquiring companies, time periods, performance indicators, empirical methodologies, da-
tabase consulted, etc. However, all of them focus exclusively on the performance of for-
eign takeovers on the acquired firm. This means that the large portion of literature that 
investigate the effects on the acquirer and on the combined firms’ performance was not 
taken into consideration into our research. 
The analysed time period starts in 1895 (Kronborg, D. & Thomsen, D., 2009) and ends 
in 2011 (Chen et al., 2017; ICE & Prometeia, 2014). Target countries investigated are 
Italy (Barbaresco et al., 2018; Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2006; Bentivogli and Mirenda, 
2017; ICE & Prometeia, 2014; Piscitello and Rabbiosi, 2005); UK (Conyon et al., 2002; 
Harris and Robinson, 2003; Schiffbauer et al., 2017); United States (Chari et al., 2009; 
Chen, 2011; Li, J. & Guisinger, S., 1991); China (Buckley et al., 2002; Chang et al., 2013; 
Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017); Indonesia (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009); Japan (Fukao 
et al., 2006); France (Bertrand and Zitouna, 2005); Belgium (Feys and Manigart, 2010); 
Sweden (Karpaty, 2007); Slovenia (Salis, 2008); Portugal (Mata, J. & Portugal, P., 2002); 
Denmark (Kronborg, D. & Thomsen, D., 2009); developed countries (Buckley et al., 
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2014); Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia 
(Damijan, 2015) and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden 
(Siedschlag et al., 2014).  
Concerning the acquirer’s country of origin, a large part of the literature does not put any 
restrictions while a portion focus, for example, on acquirers from developed or emerging 
countries (Chari et al., 2009; Buckley et al., 2014). Most of the previous empirical studies 
focus on the manufacturing industry, while the literature concerning the effects of foreign 
M&As on service firms is more limited. All the 26 studies reviewed use data on manu-
facturing firms with only 11 including also service firms.   
As already mentioned, some of the studies narrow down the analysis focusing on some 
particular characteristics of the acquiring or acquired companies. Barbaresco et al. (2018), 
for example, examine medium size target companies; Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) focus 
on cross-border horizontal acquisitions; Chang et al. (2013) investigate the performance 
of Chinese firms acquired only by MNEs; Chen (2011) focus on public companies and; 
Feys and Manigart (2010) investigate the effects of cross-border M&As on entrepreneur-
ial firms. 
3.3 Empirical methodologies and performance measures 
The analysed empirical studies have adopted different statistical approaches to measure 
the effects of foreign ownership on target companies’ performance. Moreover, the authors 
have analysed the post-acquisition performance looking at different accounting and non-
accounting variables. The choice of the statistical methods adopted as well as the choice 
of the variables that capture the performance of the targets have important repercussion 
on the results achieved.  
With respect to empirical methodologies, early analyses of effects of foreign acquisitions 
on firm performance have used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimators (Buckley et al., 
2002; Chen et al., 2017; Conyon et al., 2002; Damijan et al., 2015; Piscitello and Rabbi-
osi, 2005) or system GMM (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2006; Harris and Robinson, 
2003). Nevertheless, most of the analysed studies adopt a change model comparing mean 
or median pre- and post-acquisition performance (both raw measures of operating perfor-
mance and growth rates are used) to verify whether the change is statistically significant 
(Buckley et al., 2014; Feys and Manigart, 2010). However, these studies do not take into 
consideration the possibility that acquired companies outperform domestically-owned 
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companies just because foreign investors have acquired better performing firms (“selec-
tion bias” problem). More recent studies combine two econometric techniques, propen-
sity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-difference (DID) estimators, to address this 
“selection bias” problem. These studies include: Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Barbaresco 
et al. (2018), Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017), Bertrand and Zitouna (2008), Chang et al. 
(2013), Chari et al. (2009), Chen (2011), Fukao et al. (2006), ICE Prometeia (2014),  
Karpaty (2007), Liu et al. (2017), Salis (2008), Schiffbauer et al. (2017) and Siedschlag 
et al. (2014).  
The credibility of the DID estimator crucially relies on the assumption that in absence of 
the cross-border M&A (i.e. the treatment), the performance indicators for treated and the 
control firms would have followed similar trends over time. For this reason, in order to 
select a more appropriate control sample, the aforementioned studies adopt PSM com-
bined with DID. PSM12 is a statistical method that provides a way to match each foreign-
acquired company (i.e., treatment group) with a local firm not acquired by foreign com-
panies and with similar characteristics in the acquisition year or in the previous years (i.e., 
control group). The first step to build an appropriate counterfactual is to estimate a logit 
to derive the probability for a target of being acquired by a foreign investor on the basis 
of some specific characteristics of the target. Some of the most common variables used 
to estimate the logit in the reviewed literature include: sector (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; 
Feys and Manigart, 2010; Karpaty, 2007); location (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Feys and 
Manigart, 2010); firm size13 (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Chang et al., 2013; Chen, 2011; 
Feys and Manigart, 2010; Karpaty, 2007; Schiffbauer et al., 2017); firm age (Chang et 
al., 2013, Chen, 2011; Schiffbauer et al., 2017; Siedschlag et al., 2014); productivity 
measured for example by the multilateral productivity index (Chang et al., 2013) or turn-
over per employee (Siedschlag et al., 2014); profitability measured for example by the 
added value per employee (ICE and Prometeia, 2014)  or by return on capital (Schiffbauer 
et al., 2017); financial variables such as the debt-to-assets ratio (Chang et al., 2013; ICE 
                                                 
 
12 The validity of PSM relies on the conditional independence assumption. The conditional independence 
assumption holds whenever, conditional on the observed covariates used in the PSM, assignment to treat-
ment is independent of the outcome. This assumption is not directly testable, but we can assume it if include 
all the relevant variables (e.g. size, industry, region, performance indicators etc.) in the PSM. 
13 Arnold and Javorcik (2009) measure firm size using turnover; Chang et.al (2013) using the log of assets; 
Chen (2011) using assets, employment and sales; Feys and Manigart (2010) using assets and sales; ICE 
and Prometeia (2014) using employment; Karpaty (2007) and Siedschlag et al. (2014) using sales and em-
ployment 
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and Prometeia, 2014; Siedschlag et al., 2014) and the cash flow-to-debt ratio (ICE and 
Prometeia, 2014); the interest expenses-to-total assets ratio, a proxy of perceived trust-
worthiness by financial institutions (Schiffbauer et al., 2017); the export ratio (i.e. export 
sales divided by total sales); the intangible assets ratio measured as book value of intan-
gible assets divided by total assets (Chang et al., 2013; ICE and Prometia, 2014); the fixed 
assets ratio measured as book value of fixed assets divided by total assets (Chang et al., 
2013); variables that capture the ownership status14 of a firm (Chang et al., 2013; Schiff-
bauer et al., 2017) or that indicate firm’s solvency variable (Schiffbauer et al., 2017).  
After constructing the control group, the DID approach is applied to compare the treated 
and control groups’ performance variables and to measure whether firms acquired by for-
eigners show a greater improvement in performance than firms remained domestically-
owned for the whole period taken into consideration.  
In most cases, target firms’ performance indicators were analysed for at least two years 
before and after the acquisition. However, in some studies (e.g. Chen, 2011), acquisition 
effects are found only five years after the entry, suggesting that it could be reasonable to 
increase the analysed post-acquisition period. Nevertheless, choosing an appropriate time 
period is not an easy task since it is difficult to know a priori how many years the owner-
ship change takes to fully manifest its possible effects and because it is difficult to retrieve 
balance sheet and income statement data for long periods from databases. 
With respect to the choice of variables to measure the post-acquisition performance ef-
fects, the authors of the reviewed literature adopted a large set of variables to capture 
different aspects of performance as financial, operational, market and labour effects. Of 
course, no single variable is perfect and different metrics are appropriate depending on 
the circumstances, but we should be aware that the choice of different variables to meas-
ure the same aspect (e.g. profitability, productivity) can lead to different conclusions and 
their derivations (e.g. the derivation of TFP) can involve several measurement issues.  
Most of the studies, estimate the effects of inward cross-border M&As on total factor 
productivity (TFP) or labour productivity. Others compute profitability ratios (both mar-
gin ratios and return ratios) to compare pre- and post-acquisition performance of acquired 
firms. Chang et al. (2013), Chari et al. (2009), Chen (2011), Feys and Manigart (2010) 
                                                 
 
14 Schiffbauer et al. (2017) created two dummy variables: state and quoted; Chang et al. (2013) created 
three dummy variables: collective firm, private firm, and incorporated firm 
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and Fukao et al. (2006) use the return on assets15 (ROA). Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) 
measure the return on equity (ROE) while Feys and Manigart (2010) the net margin. Fi-
nally, Barbaresco et al. (2018) compare the pre- and post-acquisition return on invest-
ments (ROI). Other authors measure the growth of accounting measures such as total 
sales16 (Bentivogli and Mirenda, 2017; ICE & Prometeia, 2014; Buckley et al., 2014), net 
income before taxes (Buckley et al., 2014), EBITDA17 (Bertrand and Zitouna, 2008), 
R&D expenditures (Chen et al., 2017), share of exports and accounts receivable days 
(Barbaresco et al., 2018). Some studies compute operating performance ratios as value 
added per employee (Barbaresco et al., 2018), asset turnover (Feys and Manigart, 2010) 
and fixed asset investment (Liu et al., 2017).  
Many empirical studies also monitor the employment and capital intensity trends of ac-
quired firms before and after the acquisition (Siedschlag, 2014, Damijan et al., 2015). 
Finally, 3 out of 26 studies (Kronborg, D. & Thomsen, D., 2009; Mata, J. & Portugal, P., 
2002, Li, J. & Guisinger, S., 1991) investigate if foreign-owned companies have a sur-
vival advantage compared to domestically-owned comparable companies. 
Table 12 Summary of the results of empirical studies on post-acquisition performance of compa-
nies subject to cross-border M&As 
AUTHORS YEAR PERFORMANCE INDICATORS DATA/TARGET 
COUNTRY 
MANUFACTURI
NG (M) OR 
SERVICES (S) 
CHERRY 
PICKING 
Arnold, J.M. & 
Javorcik, B.S. 
2009 Total factor productivity (TFP) 
and employment 
Indonesia M Yes 
Barbaresco, 
G., 
Matarazzo, M. 
& Resciniti, R. 
2018 ROI, value added per 
employee, labor cost per 
employee, employment, share 
of exports and accounts 
receivable days 
 
Italy M 
 
Yes 
Benfratello, L. 
& Sembenelli, 
A. 
2006 TFP Italy M 
 
Yes 
Bentivogli, C. 
& Mirenda, L. 
2017 Sales, ROE and financial debt 
to assets ratio 
Italy M and S / 
Bertrand, O. & 
Zitouna, H. 
2008 EBITDA and TFP France 
(horizontal 
acquisitions) 
M No 
                                                 
 
15Chari et al. (2009) computed ROA as OIBD (operating income before depreciation) scaled by total assets 
16 Feys and Manigart (2010) analyse the sales growth. 
17 EBITDA is an indicator that gives information on the company's operating profit before non-operating 
expenses (such as interest) and non-cash charges (depreciation and amortization) and it constitutes a good 
way of assessing profits since it eliminates the influence of financing and accounting decisions. 
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Buckley, P., 
Elia, S. & 
Kafouros, M. 
2014 Net income before taxes, total 
revenues and labour 
productivity  
 
developed 
countries 
(target); 
developing 
countries 
(acquiring) 
M and S No 
Buckley, P.J., 
Clegg, J. & 
Wang, C. 
2002 Labour productivity 
 
China M / 
Chang, S., 
Chung, J. & 
Moon,  J.J. 
2013 ROA China M /  
Chari, A., 
Chen, W. & 
Dominguez, 
K.  
2009 ROA, employment and sales 
 
U.S.A. (publicly 
traded 
companies and 
acquirers in 
emerging 
markets) 
M and S Yes 
Chen, W. 2011 ROA, employment, sales and 
labour productivity 
U.S.A. M / 
Chen, Y., 
Hua, X. & 
Boateng, A: 
2017 R&D expenditures, 
investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and 
labour productivity 
 
China M and S / 
Conyon, M., 
Girma, S., 
Thompson, 
S., & Wright, 
P.  
2002 Employment, wages and 
labour productivity 
 
U.K. M No 
Damijan, J., 
Kostevc, C. & 
Rojec, M. 
2015 Employment and labour 
productivity 
Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Czech 
Republic, 
Poland, 
Romania, 
Slovenia & 
Slovakia 
M and S No 
Feys, C. & 
Manigart, S. 
2010 Net margin, asset turnover, 
ROA and growth in sales 
Flanders 
(Belgium) 
M and S No 
Fukao, K., Ito, 
K., Kwon, 
H.U. & 
Takizawa, M. 
2006 ROA and TFP Japan M and S Yes 
Harris, R. & 
Robinson, C. 
2003 TFP U.K. M Yes 
Karpaty, P. 2007 TFP Sweden M No 
Kronborg, D. 
& Thomsen, 
D. 
2009 Survival of the firm Denmark M / 
ICE & 
Prometeia 
2014 sales, employment and labour 
productivity 
 
Italy M and S / 
Li, J. & 
Guisinger, S. 
 
1991 Survival of the firm U.S.A. M / 
Liu, Q., Lu, R. 
& Qiu, L.D. 
2017 Sales, fixed asset investment 
and TFP 
 
China M Yes 
Mata, J. & 
Portugal P. 
2002 Survival of the firm Portugal M and S / 
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Piscitello, L. & 
Rabbiosi, L. 
2005 labour productivity 
 
Italy M No 
Salis, S. 2008 TFP Slovenia M Yes 
Schiffbauer, 
M., 
Siedsclagb, I. 
& Ruane, F. 
2017 TFP U.K. M and S No 
Siedschlag, I., 
Kaitila, V., 
Mcquinn, J. & 
Zhang, X.  
2014 employment growth and 
labour productivity growth 
 
 
Austria (AT), 
Belgium (BE), 
Denmark (DK), 
Finland (FI), 
The 
Netherlands 
(NL) & Sweden 
(SE) 
M and S Yes in 
BE (S), 
DK (S) & 
FI (M). 
No in 
AT (S) & 
NL (M) 
Source: Personal elaboration 
3.4 Foreign takeovers and ex ante target performance 
3.4.1 Picking “cherries” or grabbing “lemons”?  
The theoretical literature has come up with several reasons that push companies to acquire 
a firm or to merge with it. The different motivations for mergers and acquisitions may 
have different implications on how companies are expected to perform pre- and post-
acquisition. In this paragraph, we briefly illustrate three general hypotheses of motiva-
tions for M&As:  
• Managerial hubris: This motivation arises when managers of the acquiring company, 
certain of their superior skills in the face of clear evidence of the contrary, convince 
themselves that they can manage the business of the target firm more efficiently than 
the former management. A related problem is the principal-agent problem according 
to which managers may have incentives to grow their firms through M&As just to 
fulfil their desire to build a larger empire, which is positively correlated with power, 
prestige and pay (Rothaermel, 2015). If efficiency considerations are of secondary 
order in such decisions, no clear predictions can be made as to whether the target 
firm is more likely to be a “lemon” (i.e. a low-productive firm) or a “cherry” (i.e. a 
high productivity firm) before the deal. Furthermore, plant performance after acqui-
sition may not change, and could even deteriorate if managerial hubris is not com-
bined with managerial expertise. 
• Synergy effects: This view argues that bidders are looking to acquire targets so that 
synergies between the firms can improve efficiency of the combined entity. This ar-
gument claims that ‘cherries’ are more likely to be acquired in order to achieve a 
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greater market power, internalize specific knowledge, superior production techniques 
or patents right and to access to foreign markets with lower risks. In fact, the survival 
in such new markets can be assumed to be more likely by choosing leading firms.  
• Management’s comparative advantage: The idea behind this view is that poor per-
forming “lemons” may suffer a mismatch between management and operations, and 
thus are not efficient. Therefore, this argument suggests that acquiring companies 
prefer “lemons” in order to increase the target firm's efficiency through a “disciplin-
ing effect” or “efficiency-enhancing restructuring”, therefore exploiting this compar-
ative management advantage. The ability to increase a “lemon” efficiency can be 
expected to be especially a trait of MNEs. Indeed, already Dunning’s (1981) OLI 
paradigm stipulates that MNE need a specific ownership advantage in order to over-
come the lack of information and additional costs associated with entering in a for-
eign country. Along with the hypothesis that lemons are selected in order to exploit 
their assets, Gioia and Thomsen (2004) argue that foreign investor may prefer to buy 
poor performers in order to avoid the risks connected with information asymmetries 
(i.e. double market-for-lemons effect). Normally, there are information asymmetries 
about the real value of a company between the bidder and the target, to the disad-
vantage of the bidder and they are still more marked if the investor is located abroad 
and suffers a “liability of foreignness” (Hymer, 1976). 
Both in case of synergy effects and management’s comparative advantage, the perfor-
mance of the acquired firms is expected to rise after the M&A because of the transfer of 
superior specific advantages (technical know-how and management expertise) from the 
acquiring to the acquired firm (Fukao et al., 2008). Nevertheless, target firms can exhibit 
a higher post-acquisition performance just because acquiring companies “cherry-pick” 
domestic firms that already have a superior performance before the change of ownership. 
If foreign companies acquire domestic firms, a simple comparison of domestic and for-
eign companies can suffer from a selection bias, since foreign takeovers can “cherry-
pick” domestic firms. Such a selection bias can have severe implications when causality 
is in focus.  
Two conflicting hypotheses emerge from the literature of foreign acquisitions: on the one 
hand, some studies argue that acquisition targets outperform their domestic competitors 
already in the pre-takeover period; on the other hand, other studies claim that acquisition 
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targets underperform comparable domestic firms before the takeover. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that both the “cherry-picking” and the “lemon-picking” hypotheses need to be 
rejected since motives for M&As could be much more shaped by managers’ own interests 
in increasing the size of their firm (empire building). Moreover, in a world of heteroge-
neous strategies another highly plausible result could be the support for both hypotheses. 
In the reviewed literature on cross-border M&As (Table 12), evidence of “cherry picking” 
is provided by Barbaresco et al. (2018) and Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) in Italy, 
Harris and Robinson (2002) in the UK, Chari et al. (2009) in the United States, Fukao et 
al. (2006) in Japan,  Liu et al. (2017) in China, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) in Indonesia 
and Salis (2008) in Slovenia. Contradictory results that do not support the “cherry pick-
ing” hypothesis are presented by Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) for Italy, Bertrand and 
Zitouna (2008) for France, Buckley et al. (2014) for developed countries, Conyon et al. 
(2002) and Schiffbauer et al. (2017) for the UK, Damijan et al. (2014) in the Eastern 
Europe, Feys and Manigart (2019) in the Flanders and Karpaty (2007) in Sweden. Mixed 
results are given by Siedschlag et al. (2014). Evidence of `lemon-grabbing' is relatively 
scarce as opposed to `cherry-picking'. An example is given in the work of Damijan et al 
(2015), which interpret their evidence from acquisitions in the Eastern Europe as support-
ing the management’s comparative advantage hypothesis, both finding that the acquisi-
tion targets in their sample are “lemons” and observing an improvement in productivity 
after the acquisition.  
3.4.2 Pre-acquisition performance in Italy 
Previous research in Italy on the pre-takeover performance of foreign acquisitions is 
scarce. A recent study conducted by Barbaresco et al. (2018), using data from the Italian 
Mediobanca Research Department, find that Italian medium manufacturing firms achieve 
at least results not lower in the five years pre-acquisition compared to the benchmark of 
companies destined to remain domestically-owned. Moreover, with reference to some 
indicators (i.e. ROI, export share and growth rate of cross-border sales), acquisition tar-
gets show on average a higher pre-acquisition performance (ibidem). Conversely, Pis-
citello and Rabbiosi (2005) using data from the Reprint and Aida-Bureau van Dijk data-
bases conclude that multinational enterprises do not seem to systematically select lower 
or higher productive local target companies. 
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Foreign-owned and purely domestic firms may be different in many ways, most of which 
are difficult to observe and may be correlated with the probability of being subject to an 
inward cross-border M&A. For example, it may be argued that performance gaps between 
foreign- and domestically-owned companies can arise just because MNEs are concen-
trated in industries more productive than the average. Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006), 
using data from the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano and the Reprint database, show that the 
average foreign firm in Italy is more likely to operate in high-tech industries and is more 
labour-productive than the average domestic counterpart.  
3.5 Main results 
Most of the reviewed literature gives no support to the worries that foreign acquisitions 
may lead to sudden disinvestments or performance deterioration of the acquired compa-
nies.  
3.5.1 Post-acquisition performance of Italian firms  
With reference to Italy, Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) provide evidence that inward 
cross-border M&As improve the target company’s labour productivity in the medium 
term after the acquisition. The results of the econometric analysis carried out by ICE & 
Prometeia (2004) confirm such a result finding that, beyond the cyclical aspects, foreign-
owned firms in Italy record higher labour productivity (+1.4% per year) than domesti-
cally-owned firms, higher total sales (+2.8% per year) and employment (+2% per year) 
in the time horizon analysed (1998-2011). Similarly, the analysis of Bentivogli and 
Mirenda (2017) shows the positive contribution of foreign ownership in all the aspects 
considered: size, profitability, and financial soundness. Additionally, they highlight that 
only ‘true’ acquisitions generate a foreign ownership premium, while shell companies 
with parent companies located in tax havens do not affect the post-acquisition perfor-
mance of the target firm. Barbaresco et al. (2018), focusing on medium Italian manufac-
turing firms, document that in the four-year period after the acquisition they improve their 
performance (ROI), increase their workers’ wages, consolidate their employment base 
recomposing it in favour of more qualified employees (white collars), strengthen their 
presence abroad both in terms of export share and cross-border sales and significantly 
reduce the accounts receivable days. However, the evidence that inward cross-border 
M&As lead to a higher performance of Italian acquired firms is not shared by all studies: 
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Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006), for example, do not find a significant effect of foreign 
ownership on productivity.  
3.5.2 Effects on productivity in countries different from Italy 
The studies that aim to measure the effects of foreign M&As on target firm performance 
in countries different from Italy have mixed results too.  
On one side, Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Bertrand and Zitouna (2008), Fukao et al. 
(2006), Harris and Robinson (2003), Karpaty (2007) and Liu et al. (2017) show that for-
eign ownership leads to significant TFP improvements in the acquired firm. Arnold and 
Javorcik (2009), using data from Indonesia, find that the TFP improvements occur already 
in the acquisition year and continue in the following years, showing a productivity 13.5% 
higher than the control group after three years. They argue that the rise in productivity is 
the result of two distinct phenomena: the better integration of the target into the global 
market through greater exports and imports and the restructuring process of the acquired 
firms that increase investment outlays, number of employees and workers’ wages. Simi-
larly, Fukao et al. (2006) find positive effects on target firms’ performance in Japan, but 
the magnitude of the improvement is much smaller than the one observed by Arnold and 
Javorcik. This result is not surprising because the difference in technological and mana-
gerial capabilities between domestic and foreign firms is more marked in Indonesia than 
in Japan and technology transfer effects from foreign acquiring companies to domestic 
targets may be less relevant in Japan. Fukao et al. (2006) highlight also that cross-border 
acquisitions improve target firms’ productivity significantly more and quicker than ac-
quisitions by domestic firms and that the positive effects of foreign acquisitions tend to 
be much larger in the case of services sector than in the case of manufacturing industry. 
Harris and Robinson (2003) provide robust empirical support for the view that in general 
foreign-owned plants have higher TFP, with certain exceptions largely explained by the 
nature of branch plants and by the likelihood for foreign acquirers to experience cultural 
problems of assimilation. Karpaty (2007) finds that inward cross-border acquisitions in-
crease the productivity of the acquired firms in Sweden by a percentage between 3 per 
cent and 11 per cent depending on the estimator chosen and that this productivity differ-
ence does not occur immediately but starts one to five years after the M&A effective date. 
Similarly, Liu et al. (2017)’s results suggest that foreign ownership significantly enhances 
the productivity as well as sales and fixed asset investment of Chinese firms acquired by 
Foreign M&As and performance effects on the local target company: the state of the art 
51 
foreign investors and that these effects are stronger in acquisitions in which the acquirer 
and the target company have a large technological gap. Bertrand and Zitouna (2008), 
studying the effects of horizontal acquisitions on the performance of French target firms 
in the 1990s, find that cross-border M&As do not rise the profit of the acquired companies 
but increase their productivity. This result suggests a probable redistribution of efficiency 
gains upstream and/or downstream of the production process. Moreover, efficiency gains 
are stronger for cross-border takeovers than domestic ones, even if this conclusion is true 
only for extra-EU transactions18 (ibidem).  
However, the evidence of positive effects on TFP is not shared by all studies. Salis (2008) 
does not find any significant effect of foreign ownership on TFP of the acquired firms in 
Slovenia and Schiffbauer et al. (2017) find that on average foreign-acquired firms have a 
5.1% lower TFP-growth in the acquisition year than domestic firms that have a compara-
ble pre-acquisition probability of becoming a foreign M&A target. The negative initial 
impact of the acquisition suggests the presence of restructuring costs that reduce the TFP 
in the acquisition year. A relevant result found by Shiffbauer et al. (2017) is the significant 
heterogeneity in TFP effects of foreign M&A at the industry level. This finding is con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007)’s model that show 
how foreign acquirers, in comparison to domestic acquirers, are the most productive in 
industries with mobile capabilities (e.g. R&D intensive industries) and the least produc-
tive in industries where the source of firm heterogeneity is not internationally mobile (e.g. 
market expertise, advertising). 
With regard to labour productivity, many studies (Buckely et al., 2002; Buckley et al., 
2014; Chen, 2011; Chen et al., 2017; Conyon et al., 2002; Damijan et al., 2015) agree that 
labour productivity increases when domestic firms are acquired by foreign companies. 
Chen (2011)’s contribution is particularly relevant because his paper provides one of the 
first evidence that acquirer country has repercussions on the target post-acquisition 
productivity. Chen (2011) argues that U.S. targets acquired by firms based in foreign in-
dustrial countries exhibit the best post-acquisition performance with an increase in labour 
productivity greater than 13% compared to targets acquired by domestic firms. Con-
versely, acquirers from developing countries lead to 23% lower labour productivity gains 
                                                 
 
1818 Europe’s economic integration certainly partly explains the absence of significant difference between 
European and domestic acquisitions. 
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in the acquired firms compared to domestic acquisitions. Finally, in contrast to acquisi-
tions by foreign industrial country firms, acquisitions by firms based in developing coun-
tries result in lower labour productivity in domestic U.S. targets (ibidem). In contrast to 
the studies previously listed, Siedschlag et al. (2014) find that no general pattern in labour 
productivity emerges across the six investigated countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden); however, they show that the effects on per-
formance is stronger in the services sector than in the manufacturing industry. Their re-
sults support the hypothesis that effects of foreign investment on firm performance are 
likely to be conditioned by economic, social and institutional country-specific character-
istics.  
3.5.3 Effects on other performance measures in countries different from 
Italy 
With regard to other performance measures different from TFP and labour productivity, 
results are mixed too. As mentioned before, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) document that 
foreign takeovers do not raise the profitability of French companies, even on the long run. 
In contrast, Fukao et al. (2006) show that cross-border acquisitions improve target firms’ 
profitability (measured by ROA) significantly more and quicker than domestic acquisi-
tions and that the magnitude of the improvement of foreign acquisitions tend to be larger 
in the services industry than in the manufacturing sector. Chari et al. (2009), focusing on 
cross-border M&As with acquiring firms based in emerging markets, find that profits rise 
while sales and employment levels decline. The time-series pattern in the ROA numbers 
calculated by Chari et al. (2009) suggests that U.S. target firms undergo significant re-
structuring in the early years following the acquisition leading to higher profitability in 
later years. Similarly, Chen (2011) finds that targets acquired by firms based in develop-
ing countries show a profitability 8 per cent higher than targets acquired by domestic 
companies. The conclusion is similar for the case of acquirers located in developed coun-
tries which lead to a 10 per cent improvement in the post-acquisition profit compared to 
what domestic acquirers do (ibidem). Additionally, in contrast to acquisitions by coun-
tries based in developed country, acquisitions by firms based in developing countries re-
sult in lower sales in U.S. targets. Instead, Buckley et al. (2014) show that MNEs based 
in emerging countries do not significantly increase the profitability of target firms based 
in developed countries, although they raise their productivity and sales. 
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If on the one hand, there are numerous papers exploring the post-acquisition performance 
of targets in developed countries, the evidence about the effects of foreign acquisitions in 
emerging countries is limited (Chang et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). As 
mentioned before, Liu et al. (2017) find that foreign ownership increases both sales and 
fixed asset investment in Chinese targets. Chang et al. (2013) find that foreign subsidiar-
ies created through the acquisition of domestic firms outperform domestically-owned 
firms, with an average increase in ROA 0.608 per cent higher than domestic firms in the 
acquisition year, 1.11 per cent higher the following year and 0.786 per cent higher two 
years later. Furthermore, Chang et al. (2013) find that that private and incorporated local 
firms, that manifest a greater absorptive capacity, are more able to fully exploit the foreign 
ownership advantage and are more likely to be acquired than state-owned enterprises. 
This means that private domestic firms may benefit more from the foreign takeover if 
they are able to recognize, assimilate, and apply to commercial ends the value of the tech-
nological and managerial know-how offered by the acquiring MNE while state-owned 
enterprises may not possess strong motivation to learn from the acquirer after the M&A. 
One of the most recent studies conducted by Chen et al. (2017), exploring the effects of 
foreign acquisitions in China, shows that cross-border acquisitions lead to an increase in 
R&D expenditure and productivity of the acquired companies. The positive impact of 
foreign acquisitions on R&D investments and productivity can be the result of the allevi-
ation of financial constraints (ibidem).  
Focusing on entrepreneurial companies, Feys and Manigart (2010) do not measure any 
positive revenue-related synergies after the M&A (sales decline in the acquisition year 
and in the two years later, to grow at the same level as domestically-owned companies in 
subsequent years) but they find an almost immediate and consistent improvement in tar-
gets’ margins, making them more cost efficient than domestic companies. This outcome 
suggest that acquired entrepreneurial companies need time before the new foreign own-
ership fully manifest its effects. 
3.5.4 Employment effects in countries different from Italy 
Most of the empirical studies that investigate the impact of foreign presence on the host 
country’s labour or TFP, provide most of the time evidence that foreign-owned firms 
engender improvement in productivity levels. In comparison to the evidence on effects 
on productivity, the evidence on the employment effects of foreign acquisitions is less 
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conclusive. Faster employment growth is found by Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for Indo-
nesia; Barbaresco et al. (2018) and ICE & Prometeia (2014) for Italy and Conyon et al. 
(2002) for the UK. Conversely, Chari et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) find that US 
firms acquired by investors from foreign markets experience a decline in the employment 
levels, Damijan et al. (2015) find that the impact on employment is uncertain and 
Siedschlag et al. (2014) find different results in terms of employment growth in the dif-
ferent countries and industries analysed. Additionally, Conyon et al. (2002) and Piscitello 
and Rabbiosi (2005) have identified that the significant labor productivity differential 
between foreign and domestic companies, it is partly translated into higher wage levels 
in foreign owned companies. Similarly, Barbaresco et al. (2018) register that wages in-
crease due also to a rise in the share of highly-skilled workers (white collars) in the post-
acquisition period. 
3.5.5 Foreign ownership and survival probabilities of target companies 
A portion of the literature, questions if exit decisions are significantly different between 
foreign- and domestically-owned companies. In one of the first study analysing this topic, 
on a small sample (consisting of 81 foreign business failures) without control variables, 
Li and Guisinger (1991) find that domestic manufacturing firms fail almost four times as 
frequently as foreign-owned companies. Similar evidence has been found by Kronbor, D. 
and Thomsen, S. (2008), that analysing the relative survival of foreign and domestically 
owned companies in Denmark over more than a century, find evidence of a significant 
survival premium for foreign-owned companies (i.e. domestic companies have an exit 
rate two times higher than foreign subsidiaries). However, the premium declines over 
time and disappears entirely in the last decade leading up to 2005 (ibidem). In contrast, 
Mata and Portugal (2002) do not find a strong basis for supporting the hypothesis that 
foreign ownership by itself implies significant changes in the chances of survival experi-
enced by firms. They compared the survival of newly established firms in Portugal over 
the period 1983-1989 and do not find a significant survival differential among foreign- 
and domestically-owned companies when controlling for a relatively limited number of 
firm and industry characteristics. 
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Table 13 Literature review: main results 
VARIABLES POSITIVE EFFECT NEGATIVE 
EFFECT 
NO 
SIGNIFICANT 
EFFECT 
PRODUCTIVITY Total Factor 
Productivity 
Arnold & Javorcik (2009); 
Bertrand & Zitouna (2008); 
Fukao et al. (2006);  
Harris & Robinson (2003); 
Karpaty (2007);  
Liu et al. (2017) 
Schiffbauer 
et al. (2017) 
 
Benfratello 
& 
Sembenelli 
(2016);  
Salis (2008) 
 
Labour 
Productivity 
Buckley et al. (2002);  
Buckley et al. (2014);  
Chen et al. (2017);  
Conyon et al. (2002);  
Damijan et al. (2015);  
ICE & Prometeia (2014); 
Piscitello & Rabbiosi (2005) 
 Chen (2011);  
Siedschlag et 
al (2014) 
 
PROFITABILITY ROA Chang et al. (2013);  
Chari et al. (2009);  
Chen (2011);  
Feys and Manigart (2010); 
Fukao et al. (2006).  
  
ROI Barbaresco et al. (2018)   
ROE Bentivogli & Mirenda (2017)   
EBITDA  Bertrand & 
Zitouna 
(2008) 
 
Net Margin  Feys & Manigart (2010)   
Cash flow-to-
assets 
Bentivogli & Mirenda (2017)   
Net Income 
Before Taxes 
  Buckley et al. 
(2014) 
EFFICIENCY Asset 
Turnover 
Feys & Manigart (2010)   
Accounts 
Receivable 
Days 
Barbaresco et al. (2018)   
Value Added 
Per 
Employee 
Barbaresco et al. (2018)   
Labour Cost 
Per 
Employee 
Barbaresco et al. (2018)   
SIZE/GROWTH Sales Bentivogli & Mirenda 
(2017); Buckley et al. (2014);  
ICE & Prometeia (2014);  
Liu et al. (2017) 
Chari et al. 
(2009);  
Feys & 
Manigart 
(2010) 
Chen (2011) 
Employment Arnold & Javorcik (2009); 
Barbaresco et al. (2018); 
Conyon et al. (2002);  
ICE & Prometeia (2014); 
Chari et al. 
(2009);  
Chen (2011) 
Damijan et al. 
(2015); 
Siedschlag et 
al (2014) 
SALARIES Wages Barbaresco et al. (2018); 
Conyon et al. (2002);  
Piscitello & Rabbiosi (2005) 
  
INVESTMENTS Fixed Asset 
Investment 
Liu et al. (2017)   
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R&D 
expenses 
Chen et al. (2017)   
INTERNATIONALIZATION Share of 
exports  
Barbaresco et al. (2018)   
Cross-border 
sales 
Barbaresco et al. (2018)   
FINANCIAL HEALTH 
 
Debt-to-
Assets 
Bentivogli and Mirenda 
(2017) 
  
Investment-
Cash Flow 
Sensitivity 
Chen et al. (2017)   
SURVIVAL Exit Rate Kronborg & Thomsen (2009);  
Li & Guisinger (1991) 
 Mata & 
Portugal 
(2002) 
Source: Personal elaboration  
Note: studies in bold refer to Italy 
3.6 Summary and final considerations 
Out of twenty-six studies, most of the economics studies have analysed labour productiv-
ity or total factor productivity (TFP) which also accounts for the efficiency of the capital 
stock use. On the other side, business studies focused more on profitability ratios (e.g. 
ROA, ROE, net margin, ROI), accounting measures (e.g. EBITDA, sales, net income 
before taxes, R&D expenditures, share of exports), operating performance ratios (e.g. 
value added per employee, asset turnover, fixed asset investment), employment levels 
and probability of survival compared to domestically-owned companies. All the studies 
reviewed use data on manufacturing firms, with only a few including also services firms.  
With respect to empirical methodologies adopted to measure if there is an improvement 
in the performance of the target firms after the deal, some studies have used Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) estimators or system GMM. Early studies compare the mean or me-
dian pre- and post-acquisition without taking into consideration the endogeneity inherent 
to the foreign firm entry decision. Pre-acquisition performance of the target firm matters 
for the entry choice of the foreign investor: eight of the studies analysed (Table 12) show 
that foreign companies “cherry pick” the best-performing firms while eight studies find 
no evidence of cherry-picking or find that foreign firms prefer “lemons”. In order to ac-
count for the selection bias problem just like for the possibility that performance differ-
ences arise from the selection of superior target firms in an industry rather than by the 
change in ownership, a widely used approach consists in combining propensity score 
matching and difference-in-differences estimators (e.g. Schiffbauer et al., 2017). In most 
cases, performance was analysed for at least two years before and after the acquisition. 
However, in some studies (Chen, 2011), foreign acquisition effects are found only five 
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years following the deal. This aspect suggests the need to extend the analysed period, 
although it is difficult to assess a priori how many years it takes for the possible effects 
of an ownership change to manifest completely. 
Many studies give no support to the worries that cross-border M&As may lead to sudden 
disinvestments or performance deterioration of the acquired companies. With reference 
to Italy, Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017), ICE & Prometeia (2004) and Piscitello and Rab-
biosi (2005) show the positive contribution of foreign ownership in terms of labour 
productivity and sales. Barbaresco et al (2018) confirm such a result as they find that in 
the four-year period after the acquisition, medium Italian manufacturing firms improve 
their performance, strengthening their presence abroad both in terms of export share and 
cross-border sales and considerably reducing the accounts receivable days. In contrast, 
Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) do not find a significant effect of foreign ownership 
on productivity.  
Studies investigating the effects of foreign ownership on countries different from Italy 
have mixed results too. Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Bertrand and Zitouna (2008), Fukao 
et al. (2006), Harris and Robinson (2003), Karpaty (2007), Liu et al. (2017) provide evi-
dence for the view that foreign-owned plants have higher TFP than comparable domesti-
cally-owned companies. In contrast, Salis (2008) does not find any significant effect of 
foreign ownership on TFP of the acquired firms while Schiffbauer et al. (2017) find that 
on average foreign-acquired firms have lower TFP-growth. 
Studies investigating the effects on labour productivity (Buckely et al., 2002, Buckley et 
al., 2014; Chen et al., 2017; Conyon et al., 2002; Damijan et al., 2015 and Schiffbauer et 
al., 2017) agree that it increases when domestic firms are acquired by foreign companies. 
Additionally, Fukao et al. (2006) and Siedschlag et al. (2014) show that the effect on 
productivity is stronger in the case of non-manufacturing sector than in the manufacturing 
industry and Chen (2011) finds that when the foreign acquirer is based in a developed 
country, the effects on labour productivity is higher.  
The rise in productivity can be the result of two phenomena according to Arnold and 
Javorcik (2009): the better integration of firms into the global market through greater 
exports and imports and the restructuring process of the target firms. As to the latter, 
Chari et al. (2009) and Schiffbauer et al. (2017) find that domestic firms acquired by 
foreign investors experience decline of employment and sales but increase in labour 
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profitability, suggesting significant restructuring of the target firms and the downsizing 
of divisions to improve overall profitability as a percent of assets. In particular, Schiff-
bauer et al. (2017) suggest that overall labour productivity gains are likely to be linked to 
capital deepening following firm restructuring through employment reduction rather than 
diffusion of advanced technology and knowledge. Moreover, Shiffbauera et al. (2017) 
find that the effects of foreign acquisitions vary across industries. Their results are con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007) which argue that for-
eign acquirers are the most productive in industries in which the source of firm heteroge-
neity is linked to internationally mobile capabilities (e.g. R&D intensive industries) and 
the least productive in industries with low or non-mobile capabilities (e.g. advertising). It 
has also been suggested that a marked technological gap between the acquiring and the 
target company may generate a larger increase in productivity and sales in the target (Liu 
et al., 2017).  
The effects of cross-border M&As on other performing measures is mixed too. According 
to Chang et al. (2013) and Chari et al. (2009), firms acquired by foreign companies out-
perform comparable domestic firms in terms of ROA. Moreover, Fukao et al. (2006) doc-
ument that foreign acquisitions in Japan improve the ROA of the target firms significantly 
more and quicker than domestic acquisitions. In contrast, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) 
find a decline in profits of French companies that changed flag compared to domestically-
owned companies. With respect to change in sales, Liu et al. (2017) find a significant 
increase in sales of domestic firms acquired by foreign investors and Buckley et al. (2014) 
confirm such a result for targets acquired by emerging countries’ firms. In contrast, Chen 
(2011) finds that targets acquired by firms located in emerging countries experience a 
decrease in revenues compared to domestic acquisitions while targets acquired by firms 
based in developed countries experience an increase in revenues. Finally, Chari et al. 
(2009) and Feys and Manigart (2010) find evidence of a decline in sales post-acquisition; 
however, Feys and Manigart (2010) find an almost immediate and consistent improve-
ment in targets’ margins, meaning that they become more cost efficient than domestically-
owned companies.  
In comparison to the evidence on effects on productivity, the evidence with respect to the 
employment levels is less conclusive. Faster employment growth after the acquisition is 
found by Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Barbaresco et al. (2018), ICE & Prometeia (2014) 
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and Conyon et al. (2002) while negative employment effects have been found by Chari 
et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011). 
Another relevant aspect investigated by some of the reviewed studies concerns the possi-
bility that exit decisions are significantly different between foreign- and domestically-
owned companies. Li and Guisinger (1991) and Kronbor, D. & Thomsen, S. (2008) find 
that domestic manufacturing firms fail more frequently than foreign-owned companies 
while Mata and Portugal (2002) do not find evidence for supporting the hypothesis that 
foreign ownership by itself implies significant changes in the chances of survival. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The review of the literature suggests that on average cross-border M&As tend to result in 
higher productivity and profitability post-acquisition, while the effects on employment 
appear to be more mixed. However, results on the post-acquisition performance of the 
target firms are not conclusive. Further research on factors driving investors’ choices to 
enter foreign markets and on the performance effects of the target would improve our 
knowledge of the motivations and repercussions of foreign takeovers in host countries. In 
particular, future research should better investigate the effects on profitability, efficiency 
and financial structure since most of the studies mainly focus on productivity changes 
after the foreign M&A. Moreover, it would be interesting to better analyse also the effects 
on investments (R&D, fixed assets, human capital) and internationalization (export share 
and cross-border sales) to understand the strategic actions that foreign investors put for-
ward. This evidence would be also useful for providing recommendations for policy mak-
ers aimed at maximizing the benefits associated with cross-border takeovers and mini-
mizing related costs. 
 
 
 
  
 
 4. CHAPTER  
MEASURING THE POST-ACQUISITION 
PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRED FIRMS USING A 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MATCHING 
APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction  
The underlying question of this work is whether the cross-border M&As can strengthen 
the performance and competitiveness of Italian companies or, if conversely, these acqui-
sitions lead to a worst performance and foster a depletion process of our industrial and 
entrepreneurial system. Such question has been firstly analysed from an aggregate point 
of view in these terms: “Do foreign acquirers improve the financial performance of the 
target firms in the three years after the deal closure”? Later, we measured if the effects of 
foreign ownership change based on the acquirer’s country of origin: both geographical 
distance (Europe vs non-Europe) and “national cultural distance” were considered in the 
analysis. Furthermore, we verified if there are different effects based on the target macro-
industry (services vs manufacturing), form of the deal (mergers vs acquisitions), size of 
the target (SMEs vs large companies). 
We try to answer to these questions by combined a difference-in-differences approach 
with coarsened exact matching. This empirical methodology enables us to measure the 
effect of foreign ownership on the target performance and to account for the possibility 
that performance differences arise due to the selection of superior target firms rather than 
to the change in ownership. Through the matching procedure, for each acquired company, 
we find a non-acquired domestic company with a similar ex-ante probability of being 
acquired measured by some pre-takeover characteristics such as size, profitability and 
financial structure. Our treated sample include deals acquired between 2011 and 2013 and 
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the outcomes of interest we chose are a measure of size (i.e. sales) and two measures of 
profitability (i.e. ROA and EBITDA margin).  
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1 The “treated” group 
Testing the effects of inward cross-border mergers and acquisitions on the target compa-
nies is more demanding in Italy compared to other countries (e.g. USA, UK), as there is 
no ready-to-use data set for such a study. On the one hand, financial software like Factset 
Mergers, S&P Capital IQ and Thomson Reuters Eikon do not provide financial variables 
and indexes for all the foreign deals concluded in Italy. On the other hand, other financial 
software and databases report M&A data at firm level, but they have some shortcomings 
for our purposes. For example, the ICE-Reprint database has the limitation that only re-
port data on foreign-owned firms, thus limiting the possibility of identifying a control 
sample, provide few performance variables and exclude some industries. Other sources 
that contain information on both domestic and foreign-owned firms are either small pan-
els (e.g. the EFIGE dataset) or cross sections that only contain information on interna-
tionalization issues (e.g. the Bank of Italy’s INVIND survey). The only financial software 
that report information on Italian M&As along with detailed balance sheet data is Bureau 
van Dick through the combination of the two databases Aida and Zephyr. Since we do 
not have access to Zephyr database, we have overcome these shortcomings combining 
two different panels of data. The first one is Thomson Reuters M&A database19 that co-
vers over one million deals and, compared to other financial software, has complete in-
formation about the target and acquirer ultimate parent region.  
The second dataset is extracted from AIDA, a company accounts data system provided 
by the Bureau van Dijk that contains detailed income statement and balance sheet data on 
about one million companies in Italy, with up to ten years of history. 
Our goal is to analyse if target companies’ performance change before and after the ac-
quisition due to the foreign ownership. Similarly to other previous studies that analyse 
the performance of the target firms in the three-years period or four-years period after the 
acquisition (e.g. Barbaresco et al., 2018), we want to performance a difference-in-
                                                 
 
19 The content of the Thomson Reuters database is highly reliable since it is directly sourced by global 
banking and legal contributors and by a team of dedicated analysts who examine thousands of sources and 
all types of deals, from smaller, undisclosed value transactions to large mega deals. 
Measuring the post-acquisition performance of acquired firms using a DID matching approach 
63 
differences estimation based on the average of the 3-years period before the M&A with 
the average of the 3-years period after the M&A for two reasons. Firstly, focusing on only 
one year before the M&A can entails the risk of dealing with distorted balance sheet data 
(e.g. the former managers of the target could for example stop investing in R&D in order 
to increase the profitability and the valuation of the company). Secondly, the foreign own-
ership can need time to manifest completely its positive (or negative) effects, as suggested 
by the existing literature. Since in AIDA we have balance sheet and income statement 
data for no more than 10 years (2008-2017) and since in the period we built the M&A 
dataset only a small portion of companies had data available for 2017, we focus on M&A 
completed between 2011 and 2013. In this way, for the deals concluded in 2011 we ob-
serve balance sheet data from 2008 to 2010 and from 2012 to 2014; for the deals con-
cluded in 2012 we have data from 2009 to 2011 and from 2013 to 2015; and for deals 
concluded in 2013 we compared data between 2010 to 2012 with data between 2014 to 
2016. The year of completion of the deal is not included neither in the pre-acquisition nor 
in the post-acquisition years. 
To build our treated group, we started extract all the inward foreign M&As (329 deals) 
concluded between 01/01/2011 and 31/12/2013 from the Thomson Reuters M&A data-
base. More specifically, we identified the deals with the following characteristics: 
• deal status completed; 
• deal form: acquisitions, acquisitions of assets, acquisitions of majority interest and 
mergers;  
• the foreign investor acquires a controlling share (i.e. percent acquired greater than 
50%) in order to be sure that he can influence the company strategies and decisions; 
• both the acquiror nation and the acquiror parent nation are foreign. 
Then, we have narrowed the listed down to 172 deals by excluding the deals in which the 
target ultimate parent nation is not Italy. This constraint assures that both the first direct 
investor and the ultimate control along the property chain are domestic before the foreign 
takeover. In this way we are confident to analyse the impact of foreign ownership on 
previously domestically owned company that were not already subsidiaries of foreign 
MNEs.  
We have excluded targets that operate in the “financial” or “real estate” macro industry, 
since our research want to analyse the industries in which a change of ownership (and 
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supposedly of the management) can be more evident, such in the manufacturing sector 
and (other) services. For the same reasons, we also did not consider deals in which the 
acquirers’ macro industry is "financials", "government and agencies" or "real estate"20. 
The latter constraint was added because we are interested in analysing foreign acquirers 
that can influence the strategic decisions of the target company. 
The resulting dataset composed by 172 cross-border deals was then merged with the 
AIDA database in order to match each firm with its annual balance-sheet information for 
the whole period 2011-2013. Transactions have been checked one by one to be sure they 
respected all the characteristics necessary for the analysis.  
Firstly, 3 deals were delated since the target companies were not recorded in the Aida 
database and 18 deals were excluded since there were no enough balance sheet data on 
AIDA for the analysis (i.e. seven consecutive years of which 3 before and 3 after the 
takeover). Moreover, we do not have post-acquisition balance sheet data for 16 companies 
because they were ceased and incorporated within three years from the M&A and for 6 
companies that failed during that time frame. Conversely, for 23 companies we do not 
have pre-acquisition balance sheet data because the foreign investor acquired only a busi-
ness unit, a branch, certain assets or some operations for which there are no balance sheet 
data. Additionally, since target companies must remain under foreign control in the three 
years following the M&A to measure the causal effect of foreign ownership, we did not 
consider 1 deal in which the company was sold to another acquirer within three years 
from the takeover. Similarly, we delated 1 transaction in which the target was reacquired 
by the former Italian owner in that time frame. Additionally, 1 deal was excluded since it 
resulted as M&A in Thomson Reuters but not in AIDA or in other sources (i.e. company 
website, newspapers, other financial databases); and 1 deal was delated since it was actu-
ally a Joint Venture and not a M&A as reported in Thomson Reuters. Finally, 1 deal was 
delated since the acquirer (Ferrero Trading Lux SA) cannot be considered foreign even if 
its legal address is in Luxembourg because the operational headquarter is still in Italy and 
the ownership is still in Italian hands. 
After the applied changes, we come up with a final dataset consisting of 100 deals com-
pleted between 2010 and 2013, that represents our “treated” group.  
                                                 
 
20 Thomson Reuters classification. 
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4.2.2 The “control” group 
Since our goal is to match the foreign-acquired target firms included in the “treated 
group” with the most similar local firm not acquired by a foreign investor, we extracted 
from AIDA database a “control” group composed by purely domestic firms. The control 
group includes 84.452 companies with at least seven consecutive balance sheet data avail-
able (i.e. from 2008 to 2014, from 2009 to 2015 and/or from 2010 to 2016).  
Companies in the control group have the following characteristics: 
• they are not subsidiaries with foreign shareholders; 
• they have a national and a global controlling shareholder (and ultimate owner) based 
in Italy and belonging to one of the following categories: industrial companies, indi-
viduals, families or listed companies. This means that banks, financial services, in-
surances, private equity and venture capital companies, hedge funds, mutual and pen-
sion funds, foundations, governments are excluded by the sample.  
• the control group include only companies operating in one of the 67 ATECO 2007 
3-digit codes in which the treated groups are engaged. This constraint was added to 
manage a lightweight dataset more similar to the treated group in terms of industries. 
We compared the control group and the treated group to check that no companies were 
included in more than one group.  
The control group amounts to 181.660 observations. More specifically, 65.042 companies 
are used as control group for the 38 M&A concluded in 2011; 65.455 companies form the 
control for the 25 M&As concluded in 2012 and 51.163 companies are the control for the 
37 M&As realized in 2013. If in the treated group each company is present only once and 
it represents a single observation that has data for the three years before and three years 
after the takeover, in the control group it is not the same. Companies in the control group 
can be present one, two or three times in the dataset. For example, a domestically-owned 
company that has accounting data from 2008 to 2016 can be used as control for acquisi-
tion concluded in the 2011, 2012 and 2013. Therefore, that company will be repeated 
three times and a variable called “M&A effective year” will indicate if we have balance 
sheet data to perform the match for that specific year. It is worth to highlight that for each 
company only the average of the three years prior to the M&A and of the three years after 
the M&A are indicated for each variable. 
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4.2.3 Treated group: descriptive statistics 
Conversely to other recent studies conducted in Italy (Barbaresco et al, 2018; Bentivogli 
and Mirenda, 2017), our research investigates the effects of foreign acquisitions both in 
the manufacturing and in the services industry. Figure 12 plots the distributions by sector 
of the 100 cross-border M&As of our treated group. The data sample contains almost the 
same percentage of industries in manufacturing and services, showing how foreign inves-
tors are attracted by companies in both sectors and not only in the manufacturing sector 
as it often emphasized in the local newspapers. See Appendix I (Table 49) for a compari-
son of companies by industry in both treated and control groups. 
Figure 12 Treated group: target main industry 
  
Source: Elaboration of the author on Thomson Reuters data (the treated group include n=100 acquired companies) 
Table 14 and Figure 13 provide information on the nation of the foreign companies. First 
of all, most of the acquiring companies are based in Europe (66%) while a smaller per-
centage (34%) is located in countries outside the European continent. The most active 
investors are Germany, United States and France, followed by UK and Switzerland. 
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Table 14 Treated group: acquirer’s country of origin 
ACQUIRER’S NATION        FREQ. PERCENT. 
Belgium 4 4% 
Canada 4 4% 
China 1 1% 
Denmark 3 3% 
Finland 1 1% 
France 12 12% 
Germany 18 18% 
Hong Kong 1 1% 
India 2 2% 
Israel 1 1% 
Japan 4 4% 
Luxembourg 4 4% 
Netherlands 2 2% 
Republic of Ireland 2 2% 
Reunion(France) 1 1% 
Russian Federation 1 1% 
South Korea 2 2% 
Spain 2 2% 
Sweden 1 1% 
Switzerland 5 5% 
Thailand 1 1% 
Turkey 4 4% 
United Kingdom 7 7% 
United States of America 17 17% 
Total 100 100% 
Source: Elaboration of the author. 
Figure 13 Treated group: acquirer's nation 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on Thomson Reuters data (the treated group include n=100 acquired companies) 
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As mentioned in paragraph 4.2.1., we focus on three types of FDI (acquisitions of assets, 
acquisitions of majority interest, mergers) where the stake acquired was higher than 50%. 
The latter aspect was included to be sure that we select only the foreign M&As that could 
potentially lead to a change in the management practices and corporate strategy. Figure 
14 shows the forms of the deal included in our treated group. Almost half of the transac-
tions in the treated group consists of acquisition of assets (49%), followed by mergers 
(29%) and acquisition of majority interests (22%). 
Figure 14 Treated group: form of the deal 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on Thomson Reuters data (the treated group include n=100 acquired companies) 
In our research, we investigate the effects of the foreign ownership on the average per-
formance of the domestic Italian targets in the three years after the acquisition. Our out-
come of interest are sales, return on assets (ROA) and EBITDA margin. In order to get 
primary insights on the company performance the data on net sales, ROA, EBITDA margin 
and D/E are provided in Table 15 for both treated and control groups. From this table it can 
be seen that treated companies have a lower D/E ratio in the pre-acquisition period compared 
to non-acquired firms and that the financial structure improves for both groups in the post-
acquisition period. Moreover, on average, target companies have higher sales than companies 
in the control sample. Nonetheless, all maximum (and minimum) values are obtained in the 
sample of the non-acquired domestic firms, since balance sheet data for the control units are 
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highly skewed. Profitability ratios (ROA and EBITDA margin) are on average lower (and 
negative) in the three years before the acquisition for the treated companies, while unmatched 
control units have positive values. This result suggest that foreign companies do not always 
cherry-pick the best-performing companies in Italy, but they probably also grab the low-per-
forming lemons in order to restructure them.  Nevertheless, after the M&A profitability im-
proves for the treated companies and get worst for the units in the control group, although 
ROA and EBITDA margin remain still negative for the treated units. However, it does not 
mean that results will necessarily indicate that targets will be more profitable after the M&A 
as these are just indicative numbers and much more advanced analysis is needed.  
Table 15 Descriptive statistics for acquired and non-acquired companies (data for sales in thou-
sands of euro) 
TREATED 
GROUP OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Avg Sales Pre 100 41.013 73.424 0 407.989 
Avg Sales Post 100 41.453 83.446 70 507.599 
Avg ROA Pre 100 -0,05 0,43 -4,17 0,22 
Avg ROA Post 100 -0,01 0,13 -0,41 0,48 
Avg EBITDA 
Margin Pre 
99 -0,34 4,08 -40,20 0,87 
Avg EBITDA 
Margin Post 
100 -0,08 0,96 -7,69 0,85 
Avg D/E Pre 99 2,56 6,44 -2,88 45,36 
Avg D/E Post 100 1,71 6,90 -4,78 65,71 
CONTROL 
GROUP 
OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Avg Sales Pre 181.660 4.840 102.090 0 20.204.808 
Avg Sales Post 181.660 5.285 109.581 -26 21.788.564 
Avg ROA Pre 181.653 0,01 0,61 -108,50 15,25 
Avg ROA Post 181.645 0,00 1,25 -366,66 95,44 
Avg EBITDA 
Margin Pre 
172.458 0,11 11,39 -3919,36 1650,00 
Avg EBITDA 
Margin Post 
172.605 0,05 5,59 -910,40 643,20 
Avg D/E Pre 181.655 3,00 19,96 -830,91 961,87 
Avg D/E Post 181.655 2,43 16,49 -605,50 818,89 
Note: for each outcome of interest, “Avg Pre” stands for the average of the values between t-3 and t-1; “Avg Post” stands 
for the avergae of the values between t+1 and t+3, where t is the M&A year.  
Finally, an interesting aspect that could be analysed in further studies is related to the 
survival of the target company after the post-acquisition period taken into consideration. 
Even if we did not deepen this matter, we provide a general framework of the actual 
situation of the treated companies in our sample in Figure 15. Out of 100 treated company, 
at the end of December 2018, 83 firms are still active, 1 firm is active but in state of 
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insolvency, 8 firms have been ceased or incorporated, 5 firms are actually in the process 
of liquidation and 3 firms have failed. 
Figure 15 Legal status (today) of the target companies acquired between 2011 and 2013 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on AIDA data (the treated group include n=100 acquired companies) 
4.2.4 Treated group: trend for Sales 
Sales are one of the outcomes of interest we are measuring pre- and post-acquisition.  
Figure 16 show the average trends for sales for the treated group, from 3 years before the 
M&A to 3 years after. Results are mixed based on the M&A year analysed. For instance,  
Figure 16 Treated group: Average pre- and post- M&A sales (data in millions of Euro) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on AIDA data (N=100) 
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for M&As concluded in 2011 sales remain quite stable from 2008 to 2014. M&As con-
cluded in 2012 and 2013 show on average a downward trend before the acquisition year 
and an upward trend in the 3 years after. Furthermore, foreign companies have acquired 
on average larger domestic companies (average sales higher than €40 million) in 2011 
and 2013 and smaller firms (average sales equal to €20 million) in 2012. 
Interesting trends emerge by breaking down the treated sample in macro-groups. From 
Table 16 it is clear that, on average, sales increase in the three years after the M&A, 
though they remained lower than the value reached in the year prior to the deal (𝑡 − 1). 
Moreover, Table 16 show that manufacturing firms have higher average sales compared 
to firms operating in the services industry over the whole period considered. Additionally, 
acquisitions of majority interests involve larger companies (€65,2 million in 𝑡 − 1)  
Table 16 Sales trend: segmentation by target macro-industry, acquirer’s region and form of the 
deal (data expressed in thousands of €) 
 TREATED 
FIRMS 
AVG 
SALES 
T-3 
AVG 
SALES 
T-2 
AVG 
SALES T-
1 
AVG 
SALES T 
AVG 
SALES 
T+1 
AVG 
SALES 
T+2 
AVG 
SALES 
T+3 
TOTAL 100 39.954 40.857 42.227 37.665 40.511 41.870 41.979 
 (72.751) (75.022) (77.497) (73.297) (80.871) (83.835) (86.518) 
MACRO-INDUSTRY 
MANUFACT- 
URING 
53 52.990 54.419 54.746 45.833 50.763 52.457 52.722 
 (83.515) (88.908) (92.163) (85.086) (95.879) (98.663) (101.765) 
SERVICES 47 25.254 25.563 28.109 28.453 28.951 29.931 29.863 
 (55.584) (52.216) (54.216) (56.699) (58.531) (62.026) (64.188) 
ACQUIRER’S REGION 
EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
66                   
32.972    
                 
34.334    
                 
34.084    
              
31.952    
                   
31.399    
                   
31.361    
                   
30.827    
                   
(59.009)    
                  
(63.981)    
                
(62.689)    
              
(64.473)    
                   
(66.937)    
                   
(68.107)    
                   
(65.998)    
NON 
EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
34                  
53.508    
                  
53.518    
                 
58.034    
              
48.754    
                   
58.200    
                   
62.270    
                   
63.625    
               
(93.448)    
                  
(92.583)    
               
(99.431)    
              
(87.964)    
                 
(101.520)    
                 
(106.294)    
                 
(114.653)    
FORM OF THE DEAL 
ACQ. MAJ. 
INT. 
 
22 48.837 51.701 65.234 52.708 64.345 63.729 64.782 
 
(86.443) (94.684) (116.762) (100.858) (117.912) (114.761) (117.167) 
ACQ. OF 
ASSETS 
 
49 36.706 37.490 34.766 31.726 31.724 34.148 33.508 
 
(67.618) (70.450) (60.437) (60.489) (63.384) (70.690) (73.854) 
MERGER 29 38.703 38.319 37.380 36.286 37.278 38.333 38.991 
 (72.034) (67.448) (64.887) (69.656) (72.229) (76.896) (79.224) 
Note: The figures shown above are the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the sales of the treated 
companies. 
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compared to mergers (€37,3 million in 𝑡 − 1) or acquisitions of assets (€34,7 million in 
𝑡 − 1), and non-European companies acquire larger companies (€58 million in 𝑡 − 1) 
than European investors (€34 million in 𝑡 − 1). Furthermore, when the acquirer is non-
European, sales increase considerably more in the three years after the deal. 
Out of 100 treated companies, 31% of the firms in our sample had a negative trend for 
sales before the M&A, measured by a 3-years compound annual growth rate (CAGR), 
and 69% a positive (or stable trend). More specifically, from Figure 17 it is clear that 17% 
of the targets had a negative 3-years CAGR for sales both before and after the M&A while 
14% improved the trend after the change of ownership. Conversely, 28% of the targets 
that had a positive (or stable) CAGR prior to the deal, got worst after the M&A. Lastly, a 
large part of the targets (41%) showed an upward trend in both periods. 
49 of the treated firms showed a worsening in the CAGR for sales three years after the 
M&A compared to the pre-acquisition value, while 51 showed an improvement. 
Figure 17 Percentage of treated companies with positive and negative trend for sales (3 years 
CAGR) pre- and post-M&A  
 
 
Source: elaboration of the author. “Positive” refers to CAGR >= 0 and “Negative” refers to CAGR<0. 
Figure 18 show the sales 3-years CAGR for sales pre- and post-acquisition, without con-
sidering the observation with extreme values (for a better graphical representation). In the 
upper right dial of the scatter chart, all the companies below the bisector have a higher 3-
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years CAGR for sales in the pre-acquisition period while companies above the bisector 
growth at a higher rate after the change of ownership. Similarly, companies below the 
bisector in the lower left dial have a worst CAGR after the M&A, while companies above 
the bisector have an improvement. 
Figure 18 Sales 3-years CAGR pre- and post-M&A (N=88) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author 
Table 17 indicates that the 3-years sales average is 1.07% higher in the post-acquisition 
period, but the effect is positive and considerably higher in case of SMEs (+17,41%) and 
negative (-4,39%) when the target is a large firm21. Furthermore, effects are opposite in 
the manufacturing (-3,83%) and services (+12,44%) industry; positive when the acquirer 
is non-European (+11,53%) and negative when it is based in Europe (-7,70%). Lastly, the 
increase in sales is on average higher in case of acquisition of majority interests 
(+16,34%) compared to acquisitions of assets (-8,79%) and mergers (+0,18%). 
 
                                                 
 
21 SMEs are defines as companies with 3-years pre-acquisition average sales lower than €50 million; large 
firms have 3-years pre-acquisition average sales higher than €50 million. 
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Table 17 3-years average sales for the target firms before and after the M&A by a foreign com-
pany (data in thousands of euro) 
 AVG SALES PRE-
M&A (3 YEARS) 
AVG SALES POST-
M&A (3 YEARS) DIFFERENCE  
DIFFERENCE 
(PERCENTAGE) 
TOTAL FIRMS 
(TREATED) 
41.013 41.453 441 +1,07% 
LARGE FIRMS 139.691 133.557 -6.134 -4,39% 
SMES 13.180 15.475 2.295 +17,41% 
MANUFACTURING 54.052 51.981 -2.071 -3,83% 
SERVICES 26.309 29.582 3.273 +12,44% 
EUROPEAN 33.797 31.196 -2.601 -7,70% 
NON-EUROPEAN 55.020 61.365 6.345 +11,53% 
ACQ. MAJ. INT. 55.257 64.285 9.028 +16,34% 
ACQ. OF ASSETS 36.321 33.127 -3.194 -8,79% 
MERGER 38.134 38.201 67 +0,18% 
Source: elaboration of the author 
4.2.5 Treated group: trend for ROA 
Return on asset (ROA) is one of the profitability ratios we are comparing pre- and pro-
acquisition. Figure 19 indicates that, on average, foreign investors acquire profitable tar-
gets with an average ROA between 1% and 3% and that profitability decrease immedi-
ately after the deal. Nevertheless, both for M&As concluded in 2011 and 2013, the ratio 
shows an upward trend between 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3. The peak in ROA is reached, in all the 
three sub-groups, in the acquisition year 𝑡 or in the year before 𝑡 − 1.  
Figure 19 Treated group: pre- and post-M&A ROA 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on AIDA data (N=84. Outliers were excluded) 
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Table 18 show the average trend for ROA in the 3 years before and after the M&A, in-
cluded the acquisition year. It clearly shows that, on average, ROA decline after the 
change in ownership. Nevertheless, there are differences in the sub-groups analysed. For 
example, the decline is more evident in manufacturing than in services or when the ac-
quirer is non-European. From Table 18 it is also clear that firms in the services sector 
have, on average, higher ROA than manufacturing firms; European companies acquire 
targets with higher profitability (3.96%) compared to non-European investors (-0,97%); 
and targets of acquisitions have higher ROA at time 𝑡 compared to targets that merge with 
foreign investors.  
Table 18 ROA trend: segmentation by target macro-industry, acquirer’s region and form of the 
deal 
 TREA-
TED 
FIRMS 
AVG 
ROA T-3 
AVG ROA 
T-2 
AVG ROA 
T-1 
AVG ROA 
T 
AVG ROA 
T+1 
AVG ROA 
T+2 
AVG ROA 
T+3 
TOTAL 100 0,84% 0,42% 1,41% 2,28% 0,67% -0,03% -0,33% 
 (8,02%) (9,63%) (11,30%) (12,51%) (9,83%) (10,34%) (10,95%) 
MACRO-INDUSTRY 
MANUFACT-
URING 
53 0,89% -0,21% 0,09% 1,94% -0,89% -1,10% -1,40% 
 (7,56%) (11,57%) (11,29%) (14,23%) (10,02%) (11,45%) (10,98%) 
SERVICES 47 0,79% 1,18% 2,98% 2,69% 2,54% 1,26% 0,96% 
 (8,63%) (6,67%) (11,24%) (10,25%) (9,38%) (8,82%) (10,91%) 
ACQUIRER’S REGION 
EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
66 1,05% 0,14% 2,04% 3,96% 1,40% 1,17% 0,71% 
 (8,91%) (10,04%) (11,99%) (10,82%) (8,27%) (10,03%) (10,22%) 
NON-
EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
34 0,45% 0,97% 0,18% -0,97% -0,75% -2,34% -2,32% 
 (6,03%) (8,92%) (9,90%) (14,94%) (12,34%) (10,72%) (12,17%) 
FORM OF THE DEAL 
ACQ. MAJ.  
INT. 
22 2,85% 2,83% 3,13% 2,50% 1,98% 2,69% 2,16% 
 (8,41%) (6,10%) (5,89%) (7,67%) (7,70%) (8,21%) (6,60%) 
ACQ. OF  
ASSETS 
49 0,42% 0,76% 1,74% 3,59% 1,15% -0,14% -0,65% 
 (8,82%) (12,00%) (11,08%) (13,79%) (11,47%) (9,58%) (13,26%) 
MERGER 29 -0,01% -1,97% -0,46% 0,00% -1,12% -1,94% -1,72% 
 (6,16%) (6,87%) (14,50%) (13,41%) (8,40%) (12,69%) (9,42%) 
Note: The figures shown above are the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the ROA of the treated companies. 
With regard to the 3-years ROA trend, 46% of the treated units have a negative trend 
before the M&A and 54% a positive trend. More specifically, 21% of the companies have 
a negative ROA 3-years trend in both periods; 25% have a negative trend prior to the 
takeover but a positive trend after; 28% a positive trend pre-acquisition and a negative 
trend after; 26% positive trends in both periods. Moreover, out of 100 treated units, 51 
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firms had a worsening in ROA in the third year after the M&A compared to the year prior 
to the takeover, while 49 showed an improvement in profitability measure by ROA. 
Figure 20 Percentage of treated companies with a positive and negative 3-years trend in ROA 
pre- and post-M&A 
 
 
Source: elaboration of the author. “Positive” refers to a positive (>0) or stable (=0) trend. “Negative” refers to a negative 
trend (<0). 
Figure 21 illustrates graphically the percentages shown in Figure 20. For each firm, the 
3-years ROA trends before and after the takeover are depicted, providing a graphical rep-
resentation of the size of the changes occurred. Companies below the bisector have a 
better trend in the pre-acquisition period than after the M&A. Conversely, companies 
above the bisector, have an improvement in the ROA trend after the deal. 
Table 19 illustrates the change in the 3-years average of ROA before and after the acqui-
sition year. Overall, ROA decline on average from 0.89% to 0.10%, equal to a percentage 
of 0.79%. The decline is more rapid for large companies (-3.04%) than for SMEs (-
0.17%). The manufacturing industry records a sharp decrease of almost 1.40% while com-
panies operating in the services sector show on average a slight decline of 0.06%. If on 
one hand, targets acquired by European investors do not show significant change in ROA 
values after the M&A, companies acquired by non-European show a decline by 2.34%. 
The table also show that the form of the deal does not involve significant differences in 
the size of the ROA decline after the M&A. 
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Figure 21 ROA trend 3-years pre-M&A and 3-years post-M&A (N=100) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author. 
Table 19 3-years average ROA for the target firms before and after the M&A by a foreign com-
pany 
 AVG ROA PRE-M&A 
 (3 YEARS) 
AVG ROA POST-M&A 
(3 YEARS) DIFFERENCE  
TREATED GROUP (TOT.) 0,89% 0,10% -0,79% 
LARGE COMPANY 0,28% -2,76% -3,04% 
SMES 1,06% 0,89% -0,17% 
MANUFACTURING 0,26% -1,13% -1,39% 
SERVICES 1,65% 1,58% -0,06% 
EUROPEAN 1,07% 1,09% 0,02% 
NON-EUROPEAN 0,53% -1,81% -2,34% 
ACQ. MAJ. INT. 2,94% 2,27% -0,66% 
ACQ. OF ASSETS 0,97% 0,12% -0,85% 
MERGER -0,81% -1,59% -0,78% 
Source: elaboration of the author 
4.2.6 Treated group: trend for EBITDA margin 
EBITDA margin is the other profitability measure we want to compare before and after 
the M&A. Figure 22 clearly shows an increase in EBITDA margin from 𝑡 − 3 to 𝑡 − 1 
and a downward trend in the year prior to the M&A. After the deal, trends are mixed 
based on the acquisition year. Targets acquired in 2012 show an upward trend and they 
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have, on average, a margin higher than in the acquisition year 𝑡, although lower than in 
the year prior to the change of ownership (𝑡 − 1).  
Figure 22 Treated group: pre- and post-EBITDA margin 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author on AIDA data (N=84. Outliers were excluded) 
Table 20 clearly shows that in our treated sample EBITDA margin trends before the M&A 
are similar, on average, for companies in the manufacturing and services. Nevertheless, 
after the deal the ratio get worst for companies in the services sector compared to manu-
facturing industry. Table 20 also suggests that the acquirer’s origin does not seem to in-
fluence the EBITDA margin of the target, since the post-acquisition trends are similar for 
companies acquired by European and non-European countries. Moreover, the EBITDA 
margin does not seem to change considerably based on the form of the deal, even if targets 
of acquisitions of assets show worst ratio in all the three year after the deal (compared to 
mergers and acquisitions of majority interest). 
Figure 23 depicts the trends in EBITDA margin for our treated companies both before 
and after the M&A. 38% of the targets had a negative trend prior to the acquisition while 
62% a positive trend. In particular, 14% of the targets had a negative trend in both periods, 
24% of the companies had a negative trend before the deal and a positive trend after; 37%  
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Table 20 EBITDA margin trend: segmentation by target macro-industry, acquirer’s region and 
form of the deal 
 TREA-
TED 
FIRMS 
AVG 
EBITDA 
MARGIN 
T-3 
AVG 
EBITDA 
MARGIN 
T-2 
AVG 
EBITDA 
MARGIN 
T-1 
AVG 
EBITDA 
MARGIN T 
AVG 
EBITDA 
MARGIN 
T+1 
AVG 
EBITDA 
MARGIN 
T+2 
AVG 
EBITDA 
MARGIN 
T+3 
TOTAL 100 7,69% 8,36% 9,24% 5,08% 4,35% 4,78% 5,49% 
 (7,92%) (8,42%) (12,25%) (14,19%) (15,58%) (12,38%) (12,11%) 
 MACRO-INDUSTRY 
MANUFACT-
URING 
53 7,55% 8,35% 9,53% 4,53% 5,01% 5,85% 6,05% 
 (8,04%) (8,28%) (14,43%) (16,08%) (14,90%) (12,46%) (12,37%) 
SERVICES 47 7,86% 8,36% 8,91% 5,70% 3,61% 3,57% 4,86% 
 (7,87%) (8,67%) (9,38%) (11,87%) (16,47%) (12,34%) (11,94%) 
                                                   ACQUIRER’S REGION 
EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
66 8,20% 8,70% 9,10% 7,88% 4,25% 4,96% 5,74% 
 (7,76%) (7,32%) (13,39%) (11,54%) (14,15%) (12,41%) (12,68%) 
NON 
EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
34 6,77% 7,78% 9,47% 0,38% 4,53% 4,49% 5,07% 
 
(8,24%) (10,09%) (10,26%) (16,96%) (17,97%) (12,54%) (11,29%) 
                                                    FORM OF THE DEAL 
ACQ. MAJ.  
INT. 
22 7,20% 8,62% 10,38% 5,08% 4,59% 6,16% 6,19% 
 (6,48%) (7,66%) (7,95%) (16,78%) (15,57%) (10,34%) (10,16%) 
ACQ. OF  
ASSETS 
49 9,33% 9,71% 8,42% 5,76% 3,21% 3,66% 5,02% 
 (8,16%) (8,91%) (14,45%) (12,94%) (16,80%) (13,34%) (13,65%) 
MERGER 29 4,36% 4,88% 10,03% 3,46% 6,84% 6,06% 5,90% 
 (7,82%) (7,24%) (10,34%) (14,91%) (12,79%) (12,24%) (10,42%) 
Note: The figures shown above are the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the EBITDA margin of the treated 
companies. 
 
Figure 24 shows the EBITDA margin trend pre-acquisition (computed as the value in 𝑡 −
1 minus the value in 𝑡 − 3) and the same 3-years trend post-acquisition (value in 𝑡 + 3 
minus the value in 𝑡 + 1). All the companies below the bisector have better trends pre-
acquisition rather than post-acquisition. The opposite is true for companies above the bi-
sector. 
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Figure 23 Percentage of treated companies with a positive and negative 3-years trend in EBITDA 
margin pre- and post-M&A  
 
 
Source: elaboration of the author. “Positive” refers to a positive (>0) or stable (=0) trend. “Negative” refers to a negative 
trend (<0). 
 
Figure 24 EBITDA margin trend 3-years pre-M&A and 3-years post-M&A (N=100) 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author. 
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Table 21 illustrates that the average of the EBITDA margin in the three years after the 
M&A decrease (-3,63%) compared to the 3-years average pre-acquisition. The deteriora-
tion of the margin is worst for large companies (-5,09%) rather than SMEs (-3.16%), for 
targets operating in services (-4,45%) rather than in the manufacturing industry (-2,90%). 
In addition, with regard to the form of the deal, the effects are worst in case of acquisitions 
of assets (-5,24%) and almost no effect in case of mergers (-0,16%). 
Table 21 3-years average EBITDA margin for the target firms before and after the M&A by a 
foreign company 
 AVG EBITDA MARGIN 
PRE-M&A (3 YEARS) 
AVG EBITDA MARGIN 
POST-M&A (3 YEARS) DIFFERENCE  
Treated group (tot.) 8,50% 4,87% -3,63% 
Large company 7,71% 2,62% -5,09% 
SMEs 8,75% 5,59% -3,16% 
Manufacturing 8,53% 5,64% -2,90% 
Services 8,47% 4,01% -4,45% 
European 8,67% 4,98% -3,69% 
Non-European 8,22% 4,70% -3,53% 
Acq. Maj. Int. 8,93% 5,65% -3,29% 
Acq. of Assets 9,20% 3,96% -5,24% 
Merger 6,42% 6,26% -0,16% 
Source: elaboration of the author 
4.3 The empirical methodology 
A major concern of the existing literature is the possibility of “selection bias” affecting 
the estimates of the impact of foreign takeover. Often it is argued that firms acquired by 
foreign companies show better performance simply because foreign investors “cherry 
pick” the best performing local firms. If this is the case, a simple performance comparison 
between foreign-acquired and domestically-owned firms would lead to an overestimate 
of the real impact of the M&A. In order to address the potential selection bias problem 
and measure the causal effect of the foreign acquisition, we adopt an empirical strategy 
consisting of two steps: 
• Coarsened exact matching (CEM), applied to obtain a balanced sample of treated and 
control units with respect to a vector of observable pre-acquisition characteristics of 
the companies 𝑿𝑖𝑡−1; 
• Difference-in-differences (DID) approach, to estimate the causal effect of the foreign 
ownership. 
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4.3.1 Variables 
Using the data available on AIDA and Thomson Reuters Eikon, we identified for each 
company some outcomes of interest 𝑌𝑖 and some pre-treatment characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1. The 
latter are both covariates22, used in the matching procedure to find matches as close as 
possible between the treated and control groups, and nominal variables used to measure 
any difference among sub-groups.  
International business (IB) literature that covers the topic of post-acquisition performance 
of the target companies have mainly relied on accounting-based measures due to three 
reasons. First, accounting-based indicators of M&A performance measure actual and re-
alized performance as reported in the annual financial statements of the companies. This 
is an advantage over and above other ways of assessing M&A performance (i.e., cumu-
lative abnormal returns), which measure investors’ expectations for the future (Thanos 
and Papadakis, 2012). A second advantage is that they can measure multiple aspects of 
M&A performance (i.e. firm’s profitability, efficiency and effectiveness) and can provide 
a more integrated view of M&A performance. Third, by using accounting-based 
measures, researchers can evaluate the realization of synergies that, if existent, will be 
reflected in long-term accounting performance improvements (Harrison et al., 1991).  
The arbitrary selection of the accounting-based measures has an impact on the results and 
the use of multiple variables is a mean for obtaining more robust results. For example, 
Thanos and Papadakis (2012) find that IB studies using ROA report on average negative 
outcomes while the opposite is true for cash flows. For these reasons, we choose three 
output variables: net sales; return on assets (ROA)23; EBITDA margin24. 
Net sales are a common variable to measure the size of a company. 7 out of 26 studies 
analysed in Chapter 3 measure the effect of foreign ownership on sales. 
ROA appears to be by far the most widely used accounting ratio in the M&A literature to 
measure profitability. Our review (Table 12) indicates that it has been used by five of the 
studies of the core list of 26 studies. The reason for this is that ROA is less influenced by 
potential biases than other types of ratios such as ROE and ROS suffer from (Thanos and 
                                                 
 
22 Covariates are the analysis variables that can affect the relationship between the outcome variable and 
the independent variable of interest (i.e. foreign ownership). 
23 ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets, similarly to Chang et al. (2013) and Feys and 
Manigart (2010). 
24 EBITDA margin is defined as earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortization on sales. 
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Papadakis, 2012). Thanos and Papadakis (2012), evaluating the accounting-based 
measures in measuring M&A performance, find that usually this ratio calculated by di-
viding income or net income by total assets. As well as other IB studies (Chang et al., 
2013; Feys and Manigart, 2010), we decided to compute ROA as net income on total 
assets. 
EBITDA margin is a variable not common in the IB literature on this argument. Never-
theless, we include this ratio since excluding interest, depreciation, amortization and 
taxes, EBITDA margin can provide a clear view of a company's operating profitability 
and cash flow.  
Variables for matching (𝑿𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒) include both continuous variables and variables that proxy 
for some structural characteristics of the companies. They are: 
• industry, identified by the 3-digit ATECO 2007 code; 
• debt on equity ratio as a measure of financial leverage and proxy for the company’s 
ability to pay off its debts; 
• net sales, to control for size-related factors that may lead to acquisition; 
• ROA and EBITDA margin as measures of financial performance and profitability; 
The dataset contains also a dummy variable (𝐹) equal to 1 if the company is acquired by 
a foreign investor between 2011 and 2013 and equal to 0 otherwise.  
Unlike many other longitudinal matching studies where treatment occurs at one point in 
time, the companies in our data set are targets of acquisition at varying periods (i.e. 2011, 
2012 or 2013). This variation in treatment timing raised the issue of how to assign coun-
terfactual treatment dates to the firms that are not acquired by foreign investors. In order 
to overcome this problem, we built our dataset by including a variable called 𝑀𝐴𝐸25) ∈
{2011,2012,2013} and by repeating each control company once, twice or three times 
according to the availability of balance sheet data we have for that company. For example, 
Company A (belonging to the control group) that has available balance sheet data on 
AIDA from 2009 to 2016 was repeated twice into the dataset. One observation refers to  
𝑀𝐴𝐸 = 2012 and the other to 𝑀𝐴𝐸 = 2013. In this way Company A is used as comparison 
for M&A concluded in both years. This approach allowed us to have a larger control 
group compared, for example, to Chari et al. (2009) who faced this problem adopting a 
                                                 
 
25 MAE stands for “Merger and Acquisition effective date”  
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proportional-random acquisition time assignment. Chari et al. (2009) determine the frac-
tion of the total number of acquisitions that occur in each calendar year during their sam-
ple period, and then assigned the hypothetical treatment year to the firms in the control 
group in the same proportion as their occurrences in the acquisition group (ibidem).        
Table 22 provides a detailed description for each variable. It also includes the variables 
macro-industry, acquirer’s nation and form of the deal that will be used to analyse post-
acquisition performance in different sub-groups. 
Table 22 Variables description 
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION [SOURCE] 
Foreign takeover Dummy equal to 1 if a domestic firm is acquired between 01/01/2010 and 
31/12/2013 (treated) and 0 if it is domestically-owned between 2007 and 2016 
[Thomson Reuters + AIDA] 
Sector Defined by the 3-digit ATECO 2007 code 
Sales* Revenues [AIDA] 
D/E Debt/equity [AIDA] 
ROA* Net income/total assets [AIDA] 
Ebitda margin* Ebitda/revenues [AIDA] 
Acquirer nation Country where the acquirer is located (registered office) [Thomson Reuters]  
Form of the deal Acq. Maj. Interest; Acq. of Assets; Merger [Thomson Reuters] 
Macro-industry Manufacturing or Services [Thomson Reuters] 
Source: elaboration of the author (* in case of variables that are both outcomes and covariates) 
No consensus has emerged over to the proper time period that a researcher should choose 
to evaluate the performance implications on M&As’ targets (Thanos and Papadakis, 
2012). However, since balance sheet data on AIDA are available from 2008 to 2016 and 
we have a sample of M&As concluded between 2011 and 2014, for each unit 𝑖 in the 
dataset we have seven consecutive balance sheet data. Therefore, for each company 𝑖 we 
can construct a 3-years average pre-acquisition and a 3-years average post-acquisition. 
The acquisition year 𝑡 is excluded from the calculation since it is a particular year in 
which the acquired company does not result treated from January to December.  
4.3.2 Difference-in-differences method 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) is one of the most widely applied methods for estimating 
causal effects of a treatment when the treatment is not implemented as a randomized con-
trolled experiment. In our case, outcomes are observed for two groups (treatment and 
control) for two time periods (pre- and post- acquisition). The treated group is exposed to 
a treatment in the second period but not in the first period. The control group is not ex-
posed to the treatment in neither of the two periods. 
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A graphical representation of the DID estimator is illustrated in Figure 25, where it is 
assumed that the causal effect is constant across the treated. The observed outcomes of 
Figure 25 can be written as:  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼i + 𝜆t + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀it (1) 
For each observed unit 𝑖, the outcome variable is denoted 𝑌𝑖𝑡; 𝑡 ∈ {𝑃𝑟𝑒, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡}  indicates  
the 3 years average after the foreign acquisition ("𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡") or the 3 years average prior the 
foreign acquisition ("𝑃𝑟𝑒"); the coefficient 𝛼𝑖 capture all the characteristics typical of the 
company constant over time, included the acquisition year; 𝜆t indicates the full set of time 
effects of the model; 𝐹𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} is a dummy variable equal to 1 if unit 𝑖 is treated in that 
period (i.e. it was acquired in 2011, 2012 or 2013 and is foreign-owned for at least three 
years after the M&A) and equal to 0 if it does not (and is therefore domestically-owned) 
and; and 𝜀it are company-specific errors . 
Assuming that E[𝜀it|i, t] = 0, the DID estimator is equal to:  
 
[E(Y1iPost) − E(Y1iPre)] − [E(Y0iPost) − E(Y0iPre)] = 
= [λPost − λ𝑃𝑟𝑒 +  𝛽] − [λPost − λPre ] =  𝛽 
(2) 
where the first term in brackets refers to the average difference in the outcome of interest 
for the treated group and the second term to the average difference for the control group.  
Figure 25 Graphic illustration of the Difference-in-differences estimator (DID)  
 
Source: elaboration of the author 
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In Figure 25, ?̂? represents the effect of the new foreign ownership on the target compa-
nies’ outcomes of interest, taking into account pre-existing differences between treated 
and control groups and general time trend.  
Before proceeding with the explanation of the DID regression adopted in this chapter, it 
is essential to underline that our empirical strategy is based on a strong identifying as-
sumption. The identifying assumption states that the trend in Y for the control group (be-
tween 𝑡 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒) approximates what would have happened in the treatment 
group in the absence of treatment (i.e. we assume that the observed trend in Y is a good 
“counterfactual” for the trend that companies would have faced in absence of foreign 
acquisition). This means that, in the absence of treatment, outcomes depend additively on 
a common trend and a company fixed effect: 
 E[Y0it] = 𝛼i +  𝜆t  (3) 
The previous formula contains two central assumptions. Firstly, selection bias relates to 
fixed characteristics of individuals (𝛼𝑖) and the magnitude of the selection bias term isn’t 
changing over time. Secondly, time trend (𝜆t) is the same for the treated and control 
groups. These two necessary conditions for identification in DID estimation are referred 
to as common trend assumption. Common trend assumption can be summed up by the 
following equality: 
 E[𝑌0(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑌0(𝑃𝑟𝑒)| 𝐹 = 1] =  E[𝑌0(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑌0(𝑃𝑟𝑒)| 𝐹 = 0]      (4) 
The identifying assumption is not valid even though, all 𝑿𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒 being equal after CEM, 
treated and control units would have had non-parallel trends in the absence of treatment. 
This means that pre-existing differences between treatment and control groups are not a 
threat to validity per se and do not result necessarily in an unbiased estimate of the causal 
effect. Counterfactual levels for treated and non-treated can be different, but their time 
variation must be similar. Researchers often match units from the treatment and control 
groups on pre-treatment measures of the outcome or other variables to attempt to correct 
for confounding bias by balancing on variables that are different in the treatment and 
control group. Pre-processing via matching is a statistical method that can greatly reduce 
the degree of modelling necessary and, consequently, also the degree of model depend-
ence (Iacus et al., 2012).  
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Although we cannot empirically support the parallel trend assumption for a long period 
due to a lack of balance sheet data before the acquisition (i.e. we do not have data prior 
to 2008), we verified the assumption for each outcome of interest since 2008 to 2011 (see 
Appendix II). Since the first cross-border deals in our sample have been concluded in 
2011, we are sure that all the units in the treated group are not foreign-owned before 2011. 
For all the outcome variables the trend of the treated and control groups is parallel from 
2010 to 2011; for sales it is parallel for the whole period 2008-2011 while for EBITDA 
margin and ROA it is similar but not parallel in the period 2008-2010. However, trends 
are similar enough to confidently support the parallel trend assumption and are more sim-
ilar than in case of the original unmatched groups. From a theoretical point of view, evi-
dence in favour of this assumption can be found in the fact that foreign investors do not 
always acquire the high-performing companies. The existing literature provide con-
trasting evidence on the cherry-picking approach of foreign investors in Italy. If on one 
hand, Barbaresco et al. (2018) and Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) state that foreign 
investors acquire the best-performing firms, Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) provide evi-
dence against the cherry-picking approach. Therefore, we can assume that the treated 
group and the control group have on average a similar trend before the takeover. 
To estimate the DID through a regression, we use an equation in first differences. Given 
the outcome variables of interest before and after the M&A: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼i + 𝜆Post + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀iPost      (5) 
 𝑌𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼i + 𝜆Pre + 𝜀iPre      (6) 
The DID estimation came from the following equation in first-differences where: Δ𝑌𝑖 is 
the change (pre vs post) in the outcome of interest; 𝛽 is the coefficient of interest (the 
treatment effect); and 𝜆′ the: 
 Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + Δ𝜀i      (7) 
We estimate, using the statistical software Stata, the effect attributable to the foreign 
M&A for each outcome of interest, by simply including in Equation 7 the cem_weights 
generated through the CEM algorithm. We did not include any covariate Δ𝑋𝑖𝑡 in the re-
gression to control for the remaining imbalance, since we do not have any time-varying 
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𝑋𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 that is not influenced by the treatment. Nevertheless, we already accounted for the 
most important covariates through the matching procedure.   
Robust standard errors are estimated to account for heteroskedasticity and provide unbi-
ased results. 
Besides the general regression illustrated in equation 7, we performed additional regres-
sions accounting separately for: acquirer’s region (European vs Non-European), macro-
industry (manufacturing vs services), form of the deal (acquisition vs merger) and size 
(SMEs vs large companies). To test for these additional characteristics, we added some 
interaction terms to the equation 7, as illustrated in the paragraph 4.4.  
4.3.3 Basic evaluation and analysis of unmatched data 
We start our analysis by providing a DID estimation of unmatched data. First, we recap 
the size of the unmatched treated and control groups (Table 1Table 23). 
Table 23 Size of the unmatched treated and control groups 
Treated Freq. 
0 181.660 
1 100 
Source: elaboration of the data 
The (unadjusted and therefore likely biased) DID can be found by a simple linear regres-
sion of Δ𝑌𝑖 on treatment. Results show that foreign ownership has a non-significant effect 
on all the outcomes of interest. From Table 24 we can see that the effect of foreign acqui-
sition on sales are nonsignificant and negative (B= -12.7617; t= -0.00; p>0.1).  
Table 25 shows that the effect on ROA is non-significant and positive (B=0.0549; t=1.33; 
p>0.1). From  
Table 26 we can see that the effect on EBITDA margin is non-significant and positive 
(B=0.4888; t=1.12; p>0.1).  
Nevertheless, without matching treated and control units are highly different and pre-
treatment covariates differ between the two groups. 
The overall imbalance is given by the ℒ1 statistic introduced by Iacus, King, and Porro 
(2012) as a comprehensive measure of global imbalance. It is based on the L1 differences 
between the multidimensional histogram of all pre-treatment covariates in the treated 
group and the same in the control group. Perfect global balance is indicated by ℒ1 = 0, 
and larger values indicate larger imbalance between the treated and control groups, with 
a maximum imbalance of ℒ1 = 1, which indicates complete separation. A good matching  
Measuring the post-acquisition performance of acquired firms using a DID matching approach 
89 
Table 24 DID estimation on unmatched data through a regression model: output variable Sales 
 
 
Table 25 DID estimation on unmatched data through a regression model: output variable ROA 
 
 
Table 26 DID estimation on unmatched data through a regression model: output variable 
EBITDA margin 
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solution should produce a reduction in the ℒ1 statistic (Blackwell et al., 2009). 
We compute the ℒ1 statistic, as well as several unidimensional measures of imbalance in 
Stata through the following command:  
 
where mean_sales_pre indicates average sales from t-3 to t-1, mean_roa_pre stands for 
average ROA from t-3 to t-1, mean_ebitdam_pre is the average EBITDA margin from t-
3 to t-1, mean_debt_on_equity_pre is the average D/E for the period t-3 to t-1, 
ateco073digit is the 3-digit ATECO 2007 code, and maeeffectivedateyear indicate the 
acquisition year (for the treated units) and the availability of balance sheet data for the 
analysis (for control units): 
Table 27 Imbalance of the unmatched data 
 
The overall ℒ1 statistic measure (L1 = 0.9929) includes imbalance with respect to the full 
joint distribution, including all interactions, of the covariates. The L1 value in Table 27 
is not valuable on its own, but rather as a point of comparison between matching solu-
tions. The value 0.9929 is a baseline reference for the unmatched data. Once we have a 
matching solution, we will compare its ℒ1 value to 0.9929 and gauge the increase in bal-
ance due to the CEM solution from that difference. The unidimensional measures Table 
27 are all computed for each variable separately. 
The first column, labelled “L1”, reports the ℒ𝑖
𝑗
 measure, which is L1 computed for the 
𝑗th variable separately (which of course does not include interactions). The second col-
umn in the table of unidimensional measures, labelled “mean”, reports the difference in 
means. The remaining columns in the table report the difference in the empirical quantiles 
of the distributions of the two groups for the 0th (min), 25th, 50th, 75th, and 100th (max) 
percentiles for each variable (Blackwell et al., 2009). 
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Table 27 shows that variable mean_sales_pre, for example, is imbalanced in the raw data 
in many ways. This table also illustrates the point that balancing only the means between 
the treated and the control groups does not necessarily guarantee balance in the rest of the 
distribution. Most important, of course, is the overall ℒ1 measure, because even if the 
marginal distribution of every variable is perfectly balanced, the joint distribution can still 
be highly imbalanced (Blackwell et al., 2009). 
4.3.4 Coarsened Exact Matching 
Matching is a nonparametric method of controlling for some or all the cofounding influ-
ence of pre-treatment control variables in observational data. The key goal of matching 
methods is to prune observations from the dataset so that the remaining observations have 
better balance between the treated and the control groups. This means that the empirical 
distributions of the covariates (𝑿𝑖𝑡−1) in the matched groups are more similar than in the 
original groups.  
The most common matching methods involve finding, for each treated unit 𝑖, at least one 
control unit that is “similar” on the covariates 𝑿𝑖𝑡−1. The distinction between methods is 
how to define this similarity. For example, exact matching simply matches a treated unit 
to all the control units with the same covariate values by ensuring perfect balance but a 
few matches, especially when there are several continuous variables as in our case. Con-
versely, approximate matching methods specify a metric to find control units that are 
close to the1 treated unit. This metric, in similar studies on the post-acquisition perfor-
mance of target acquired by foreign investors, is often the propensity score (i.e. the prob-
ability of being treated, conditional on the covariates).  
CEM is a relatively new method introduced by Iacus, King and Porro (2009) to improve 
the estimation of causal effects by reducing imbalance in covariates between the treated 
and the control group. CEM is a monotonic imbalance-reducing method. It means that 
reducing the maximum imbalance on one variable has no effect on the other variables and 
that the balance between the treated and the control group is chosen ex ante by the user 
rather than being discovered through the usual laborious process of checking after the 
fact, tweaking the method and repeatedly reestimating it.  
The basic idea of CEM is to look for domestic firms that were not acquired by foreign 
investors but had similar pre-takeover characteristics to become a foreign target in the 
acquisition year. 
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From a practical point of view, the CEM algorithm works in the following manner (Black-
well et al., 2009): 
• make a copy of the covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, which we denote as 𝑋𝑖𝑡 −1
∗ ; 
• each variable is temporarily coarsened into substantively meaningful groups (i.e. the 
algorithm coarsens 𝑋𝑖𝑡 −1
∗  according to user-defined cut points or according to the 
CEM’s automatic binning algorithm); 
• create one stratum for each observation of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 −1
∗   and place each observation in a 
unique stratum; 
• assign these strata to the original data, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, and drop any observation whose stratum 
does not contain at least one treated and one control unit (i.e. CEM makes exact 
match on the coarsened data, and then retain only the original uncoarsened values of 
the matched data). 
Once completed, these strata are the foundations for calculating the treatment effect. 
Because coarsening is a process at the heart of measurement, it is extremely important to 
coarsen a variable into groups that preserve information. Larger bins (more coarsening) 
used to generate 𝑋𝑖𝑡 −1
∗  will result in fewer strata and more matches. Nevertheless, fewer 
strata will result in more diverse observations within the same strata and consequently in 
higher imbalance.  
An advantage of CEM, is that in contrast to other approximate matching methods, it does 
not require a separate step prior to matching, where the data are restricted to the region of 
common empirical support of the treated and control units. Iacus et al. (2012) show that 
CEM dominates commonly used existing matching methods (e.g. propensity score and 
Mahalanobis matching) in its ability to reduce imbalance, model dependence, estimation 
error, bias, variance, mean square error, and other criteria.  
The first step of CEM analysis requires to choose a reasonable coarsening for each vari-
able 𝑿𝑷𝑹𝑬. In general, we want to set the coarsening for each variable such that substan-
tively indistinguishable values are grouped and assigned the same numerical value26. Ob-
viously, coarsened values must be chosen in a customized way based on substantive 
knowledge of the measurement scale of each variable. The more coarsening we allow, 
                                                 
 
26 Note: any coarsening during the CEM procedure is used only for matching. Afterwards, the original values 
of the variables are passed on the analysis stage for all matched observations. 
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the more matches we have, but larger the bound on model dependence and estimation 
error (Blackwell et al., 2009).  
In the CEM procedure, variables “sector” (ateco073digit) and “MAE” (abbreviation for 
maeeffectivedateyear) are not coarsened. In this way, companies are matched only if they 
operate in the same industry identified by the ATECO 2007 three-digits code. Moreover, 
companies acquired at time 𝑡 are matched with control units that have data from 𝑡 − 3 to 
𝑡 + 3. Continuous variables are usually coarsened according to the distribution of the 
variable, in a way that ensure the closest matches possible without losing a large propor-
tion of the sample. The goal in this phase is to increase the number of matches and de-
crease the multivariate imbalance measure ℒ1. With regards to sales we coarsened data 
based on the ISTAT classification in small firms (sales< €10 million), medium firms (€10 
million<sales<€50 million) and large companies (sales>€50 million). ROA and EBITDA 
margin were coarsened based on their distribution among the two groups and trying to 
preserve relevant information (distinguish for example negative ratios by positive ones). 
Debt on equity ratio was coarsened based on its distribution in the sample and based on 
Moody’s (2006) report about the distribution of common financial ratios by assigning the 
following cutpoints: negative values (from -5 to 0), values between 0 and 1, and values 
higher than 5.  
 
 
 
We can see from the matching summary (Table 28) the combinations of coarsened 
response choices for all matching variables specified in the command. In this case, there 
are 19917 combinations, but among them only 72 have at least one treated company and 
one untreated company (i.e. matched strata). From Table 28 we see that 75 out of 100 
treated companies are matched with as many control observations. The multivariate L1 
distance with a value of 0.3866 show a significant reduction in imbalance compared to 
the unmatched solution we obteined in parahraph 4.5 (L1 = 0.9929). 
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Table 28 Matching summary (CEM)  
4.4 Empirical results: matched sample 
In this chapter are stated and tested 3 hypotheses based on the aggregate matched data. In 
the following paragraphs will be tested other 15 hypotheses based on relevant distinctive 
characteristics of the target or the acquirer. The outcomes of interest are in all cases sales, 
ROA and EBITDA margin, but the effect of foreign ownership on these outcomes is 
tested both for the aggregate matched sample and for five different sub-groups of the 
matched sample: European vs non-European acquirers, acquirers based in Latin Europe 
vs acquirers not based in Latin Europe; manufacturing vs services, mergers vs acquisi-
tions, and SMEs vs large companies. 
4.4.1 Sales 
Out of 26 studies analysed in Chapter 3, 4 studies (Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2017; Buckley 
et al., 2014; ICE & Prometeia, 2014; Liu et al., 2017) find positive effects of foreign 
ownership on the sales of the target, 2 studies (Chari et al., 2009; Feys & Manigart, 2010) 
find negative effects, and 1 paper (Chen, 2011) finds no significant effect. 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 29) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and sales (where 𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = Δ𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠). The p-
value of the model is higher than 0.05, so the relationship between sales and foreign own-
ership is not statistically significant. The results show that foreign ownership has a posi-
tive but not significant effect on sales (B=2259.872; t=0.66; p>0.1). 
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Table 29 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales 
 
 
Previous studies in Italy, show a statistically significant growth for sales after the M&A. 
Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) find that after the deal, net sales of acquired firms improve 
by 7% compared to counterfactuals, even if the greater effects emerge three years after 
the acquisition. ICE and Prometeia (2014) find that target companies, after being incor-
porated by foreign MNEs, have grown on average in terms of sales (+2.8% per year). 
Conversely to previous studies, we find that there are no significant effects on sales 
growth. This result is extremely interesting because it indicates that foreign owners are 
not better (but not even worse) than Italian owners in the short term. Or maybe, it can 
indicate that foreign investors do not want to make the firm grow by reinvesting profits. 
Or maybe, considering that Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) find that the greatest effects 
in net sales emerge three years after the takeover, to find sales growth we should extend 
the period analyzed to more than 3 years. After all, there are really positive cases such as 
Gucci that in 2017 reached a turnover of €6.2 billion (+44.6% compared to the previous 
year) (Zanzi, 2008). 
4.4.2 ROA 
5 out of 26 studies reviewed in Chapter 3 (Chang et al., 2013; Chari et al., 2009; Chen, 
2011; Feys and Manigart, 2010; Fukao et al., 2006) find a positive effect of foreign own-
ership on the target company. Conversely, Thanos and Papadakis (2012)’s review of stud-
ies using ROA as a measure of M&A performance indicate that acquisitions on average 
deteriorate financial performance for both the acquiring and target firms.  
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 30) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and ROA (where 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑎 = Δroa). The results 
Cross-border M&As and performance: are Italian firms better off when acquired by foreign companies? 
96 
show that foreign ownership predicts ROA positively but not significantly (B=0.0337; 
t=0.62; p>0.1). After the M&A, target companies experience an increase in profitability, 
measured by EBITDA margin, higher than comparable domestically-owned companies. 
Table 30 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA 
 
 
4.4.3 EBITDA margin 
The studies analized in chapter 3 do not investigate the foreign ownership effects on the 
EBITDA margin. However, given the relevance of this ratio we performed a first-differ-
ence regression analysis in Stata (On the one hand, this improvement in EBITDA margin 
can be considered as an increase in the cash operating profit margin of the targets before 
capital expenditures, taxes, and capital structure are taken into account. The ratio indi-
cates that for every euro of revenue 
Table 31) in order to analyse the relationship between foreign ownership and EBITDA 
margin (where 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑚 = ΔEBITDA margin). The model in this case has a p-
value<0.05 and show a statistically significant relationship between foreign ownership 
and EBITDA margin (debitdam = Δebitdamargin). Our empirical results suggets that 
foreign ownership explains 2,86% of the variance in EBITDA margin and that foreign 
acquirers have a positive and significant effect on EBITDA margin (B=0.4504, t=2.07, 
p<0.05). These findings suggest that after the M&A, target companies experience an in-
crease in profitability, measured by EBITDA margin, higher than comparable domesti-
cally-owned companies. 
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On the one hand, this improvement in EBITDA margin can be considered as an increase 
in the cash operating profit margin27 of the targets before capital expenditures, taxes, and 
capital structure are taken into account. The ratio indicates that for every euro of revenue 
Table 31 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA 
margin 
 
 
earned is generated more cash. However, EBITDA margin has some limitations. For ex-
ample, it ignores changes in working capital, which is usually needed in growing a busi-
ness and it does not take into account capital expenditures which are needed to replace 
assets on the balance sheet. Moreover, EBITDA margin can improve in the short term 
just because the new foreign owner does not invest in R&D expenses or in advertising, 
or because of downsizing (e.g. when a foreign investor acquires a retailer, it can close 
some stores) that results in lower costs of personnel in the short term but that can be 
negative in the long term if highly-skilled employees are fired. If we had balance sheet 
data for a longer time horizon, we could investigate the long-term performance of the 
target companies. However, since we just have data till 2016, we can only analyse how 
many acquired companies are still active today. 
4.5 Empirical results based on acquirer’s region of origin 
Numerous are the constructs of “distance” applied in the studies related to the interna-
tionalization of the firms. The mostly applied construct is surely the “national cultural 
distance”, defined by Kogut and Singh (1988) as the degree to which the cultural norms 
                                                 
 
27 EBITDA margin eliminates the effects of non-cash expenses such as depreciation and amortization. 
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in one country are different from those in another country. Recognized as a crucial organ-
izational variable, culture is an elusive construct, a complex product of different elements, 
such as geographical, historical, economic, religious, and ideological (Ronen and Shen-
kar, 2013). The first study that has considered cultural differences in organizations based 
on their geographical origin was conducted by Hofstede (1980), which define culture as 
“the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human 
group from another” (Hofstede, 1980, p.25).  
Cultural differences play a predominant role in the post-merger integration (PMI) phase. 
The bulk of the literature argues that national cultural distance hinders cross-border M&A 
performance by increasing the costs of integration. Barbaresco et al. (2018) find that 
higher the “cultural distance” between the target and acquiring company’s country, lower 
the growth of sales and lower the EBITDA post-acquisition. Larger the differences in 
values (à la Hofstede) between the acquirer and the target, higher the probability that post-
acquisition performance is not aligned to the expectations. This means that the incompat-
ibility of the organizational and managerial models can has negative effects that prevail 
on the positive ones that should arise from the contamination among different cultures. 
Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) argue that the beneficial effects from inward FDI through 
acquisition in Italy are higher when the acquirer is a European-based MNE and positive 
as well, although weaker, when it is a US or a UK company. 
As well as Barbaresco et al. (2018), Meyer and Altenborg (2008) argue that the stronger 
the national cultural distance, the higher the difficulty in predicting to what extent the 
knowledge transfer will be effective after the M&A. Similarly, House et al. (2014) state 
that cultural misunderstandings are often the cause of cross-border acquisition failures. 
Nevertheless, some studies argue that certain conditions allow for cultural distance to be 
a potential success factor in cross-border M&As. Morosini et al. (1998) provided empir-
ical support for the notion that national cultural distance enhances cross-border acquisi-
tion performance. They highlight the fact that cross-border acquisitions that perform bet-
ter are those in which the routines and repertoires of the target's country of origin are, on 
average, more distant than those of the acquirer. Some of these routines and repertoires, 
such as those related to inventiveness, innovation, entrepreneurship, and decision-making 
practices, have been found to be relevant to performance, and also difficult to develop 
and imitate across different national cultures (ibidem).  
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Obviously, the target post-acquisition performance depends on the degree to which the 
acquirer manages to integrate the target. Slangen (2006) argues that cultural distance has 
negative effects on the post-acquisition performance of the target in case of high integra-
tion between the acquirer and the target, while it improves the performance in case of a 
low degree of integration. In other words, cultural distance produces negative effects 
when the target company has a little autonomy left after the M&A (ibidem). 
For the aforementioned reasons, by including Equation 7 a variable based on the concept 
of national cultural distance, it can provide meaningful insights related to the effects of 
acquirer’s country of origin on the post-M&A performance. We perform two different 
regressions. The first one is based on the purely concept of geographical distance as in 
Barbaresco et al. (2018) and Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005), by distinguish European ac-
quirers by non-European acquirers. The second one is based on Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013)’s cluster map (Figure 26). This classification considers other aspects apart from 
geographic distance and it has the goal to give an answer to the large portion of the liter-
ature (e.g. Barbaresco et al., 2018) that argue that argue that cultural distance is more 
relevant than the geographic distance. Ronen and Shenkar (2013) have identified coun-
tries relatively similar on relevant dimensions and their cluster map shows where prac-
tices affirmed in one country can be diffused, a vital challenge for MNEs. 
Figure 26 The new world map represented in a tree-like form (Ronen and Shenkar) 
 
Source: Ronen, S. & Shenkar, O. (2013) 
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4.5.1 European acquirers vs non-European acquirers 
The classification European vs non-European acquirers, based on the geographical dis-
tance notion adopted by Barbaresco et al. (2018) and Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005), can 
provide interesting insights given the EU debate summarized in Chapter 2 concerning the 
efforts of the EU to protect critical European assets against cross-border deals. Despite 
our goal is not to give considerations about the risks connected to foreign influence and 
strategic dependence, by comparing M&As concluded by European and Non-European 
acquirers we could measure the effects on the performance of Italian targets when the 
acquirer is European or not.  
Out of 75 matched treated companies, 48 have been acquired by European companies and 
27 by non-European companies. Among the latter, United States acquirers are prevailing. 
Given 𝐸𝑈𝑖 equal to 1 if the acquirer is European and equal to 0 if the acquirer is non-
European, the equation used to estimate the effect of the foreign M&A on the outcome of 
interests 𝑖: 
 
          Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + δ(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐸𝑈𝑖) + Δ𝜀i  (9) 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 32) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and Sales (where 𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = Δsales) in case 
of European and non-European acquirer. The model does not show a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between foreign European ownership and sales. Indeed, foreign M&As 
by a European investor28 has a positive but not significant effect (B=861.629, t=0.24, 
p>0.1) on the sales of the target. M&As by non-European investors show also a positive 
but non-significant effect (B=4745.637, t=0.94, p>0.1). 
                                                 
 
28 Note: the command “lincom” that we use in this paragraph and in the following ones, test hypotheses on 
linear combination of regression coefficients. With interactions effects, it is necessary to construct hypothe-
ses tests and confidence intervals on linear combinations of regression coefficients. In this specific case, the 
estimated effect of foreign acquisition by a European acquirer is given by the combination of β and 𝛿. 
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Table 32 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Eu-
ropean vs non-European Acquirers) 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 33) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and ROA (where 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑎 = ΔROA) in case of 
European and non-European acquirer. The model does not show a statistically significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and ROA. Indeed, foreign M&As by a European 
investor has a positive but not significant effect (B=0.0628, t=0.76, p>0.1). Conversely, 
M&As by a non-European investor show a negative but non-significant effect (B= -
0.0181, t= -0.90, p>0.1). 
We also run a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 34) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and EBITDA margin (where 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑚 =
ΔEBITDAmargin) in case of European and non-European acquirer. The model has a p-
value>0.1 and does not show a statistically significant relationship between the dependent 
and the independent variables. Nevertheless, without considering the low quality of the 
model, targets acquired by European companies show a positive and significant effect on 
EBITDA margin (B=0.4407; t=1.89; p<0.1). Similarly, targets of non-European 
companies show a positive and significant effect (B=0.4673; t=1.83; p<0.1). 
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Table 33 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Eu-
ropean vs non-European Acquirers) 
 
Table 34 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA 
margin (European vs non-European Acquirers) 
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4.5.2 Acquirers based in Latin Europe vs Other countries 
Based on the cluster map developed by Ronen and Shenkar (2013), we distinguish Latin 
Europe from the other regions. This classification, apart from geographical distance, in-
clude also other economic, linguistic, religious and cultural dimensions, and can be con-
sidered a better proxy for national cultural distance. Given 𝐿𝐸𝑖 equal to 1 if the acquirer 
is based in Latin Europe (i.e. Belgium, France, Israel, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland (Fr)) 
and equal to 0 if the acquirer is not based in Latin Europe, the equation used to estimate 
the effect of the foreign M&A on the outcome of interests is: 
  Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + δ(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝐿𝐸𝑖) + Δ𝜀i           (10) 
Out of 75 matched treated companies, 27 have been acquired by Latin-European compa-
nies and 58 by firms based in other countries. 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 35) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and sales (where 𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = Δsales) in case of  
 
Table 35 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales 
(Latin European vs Other Acquirers)  
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acquirers based in Latin Europe and others acquired. The p-value of the model (p-
value>0.1) does not indicate the reliability of foreign ownership to predict sales. 
Nevertheless, both acquirers based in Latin Europe and outside this area, show a positive 
(respectively B=3614.293 and B=1862.887) but not significant effect on sales compared 
to purely domestic firms. 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 36) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and sales (where 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑎 = ΔROA) in case of 
acquirers based in Latin Europe and others acquired. The model (p-value>0.1) do not 
show statistically significant relationship between X and Y. If on the one hand, acquiring 
companies based in Latin Europe have a negative non significant effect on the ROA of 
the target (B= -0.0319; t=-0.93; p>0.1), acquirers based outside this ragion have a non 
significant positive effect on ROA (B=0.0529; t=0.77; p>0.1). 
Table 36 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA 
(Latin European vs Other Acquirers) 
 
 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 37) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and EBITDA margin (where 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑚 =
ΔEBITDAmargin) in case of acquirers based in Latin Europe and others acquired. Results 
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empirically support the argument that national cultural distance enhances cross-border 
acquisition performance. The acquired companies demonstrate higher EBITDA margin 
(debitdam = Δebitdamargin) when the bidder is not based in Latin Europe (B=0.5398, 
t=2.32, p<0.05). This finding is not in line with the large portion of the literature that 
argue that larger the differences in values (à la Hofstede) between the acquirer and the 
acquired company, higher the probability that post-acquisition performance gets worse. 
Nevertheless, the result is consistent with the arguments proposed by Morosini et al., 
(1998) and by O’Grady and Lane (1996). On the one hand, Morosini et al., (1998) debate 
that the best-performing acquisitions are those in which the routines and repertoires of 
the target's country of origin are, on average, more distant than those of the acquirer's 
country. On the other hand, O’Grady and Lane (1996) introduced the concept of “psychic 
distance paradox”29. They argue that operations in psychically close countries are not  
Table 37 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA 
margin (Latin European vs Other Acquirers) 
 
                                                 
 
29 Psychic distance is a larger, more encompassing, concept than simply cultural difference. When conceptualizing dis-
tance in the internationalization process. O’Grady and Lane (1996) include business factors, such as legal and competitive 
environments in the definition of psychic distance. 
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necessarily easy to manage, because assumptions of similarity can prevent executives 
from learning about critical differences (ibidem). 
4.6 Empirical results based on target macro-industry 
Most of the existing literature on the post-acquisition performance of the target distin-
guish manufacturing industry from services sector. Schiffbauer et al. (2017) emphasize 
the importance of introducing industry differences in the analysis. Their research on for-
eign acquisitions of UK manufacturing companies acquired between 1999 and 2008 sug-
gests that cross-border acquisition have different effects across industries, leading to 
higher productivity in ICT manufacturing industries, but not in ICT service industries. 
Their result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Nocke and Yeaple (2007), 
that argue that firms in R&D-intensive sectors have positive results while firms in mar-
keting-intensive industries show negative results.  
Based on our sample and on the data available, we differentiate the macro-industry in two 
groups: manufacturing industry and services sector, who have different dynamics, differ-
ent average financial performance and different post-merger integration strategies. Out of 
75 matched treated companies, 38 operate in the manufacturing industry and 37 in the 
services sector. 
Let 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is operating in the manufactur-
ing industry and equal to 0 if it is operating in the services industry: 
             Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + δ(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖) + Δ𝜀i     (11) 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 38) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and sales (where 𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = Δsales), differen-
tiating targets by macro-sectors. Both acquired companies operating in the manufacturing 
sector (B=3698.949; t=0.79; p>0.1) and services (B=781.9007; t=0.24; p>0.1) show a 
non-significant positive effect on sales. These empirical results are consistent with the 
aggregate results. 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 39) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and ROA (where 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑎 = ΔROA), differenti-
ating targets by macro-sectors. Target companies operating in manufacturing sector have 
a negative non-significant effect (B= -0.0139; t=-0.68; p>0.1) while targets in the services 
sector a positive non-significant result (B=0.0826; t=0.78; p>0.1). 
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Table 38 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales 
(Manufacturing vs Services) 
 
Table 39 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA 
(Manufacturing vs Services) 
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We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 40) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and EBITDA margin (where 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑚 =
ΔEBITDAmargin), differentiating targets by macro-sectors. When the target operates in 
the manufacturing industry, foreign ownership has a positive effect on the EBITDA mar-
gin (B=0.6099; t=2.28; p<0.05). The effect on the targets operating in the services indus-
try is non-significant and positive (B=0.2820; t=1.37; p>0.1). This result could be ex-
plained by the fact that it is more difficult to integrate two companies in the services 
sector. This can be due to at least two factors: firstly, typically targets in the services 
industry have higher levels of intangibles assets (Table 41) that are more difficult to inte-
grate and to exploit to develop synergies. Secondly, the most important resource of com-
panies operating in the services sector is usually human capital and people can be more 
difficult to integrate than manufacturing plants. 
Table 40 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA 
margin (Manufacturing vs Services) 
 
Table 41 3-years Avg. Intangible/Tot. Assets Pre-M&A 
 OBS. MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
SERVICES 47 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.70 
MANUFACTURING 53 0.09 0.15 0 0.54 
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4.7 Empirical results based on the form of the deal 
A major shortcoming of many studies in finance is that researchers typically aggregate 
all types of acquisitions in their studies. With synergies varying significantly across ac-
quisitions types (Lubatkin, 1983), the wisdom behind such aggregation is questionable. 
Moreover, different forms of the deal could be related to a different post-merger integra-
tion (PMI) process, which play a critical role in M&A success. 
It is plausible to state that in case of “acquisitions” the foreign acquirer of a controlling 
stake has a dominant position while in “mergers” prevail different logic of cooperation 
and knowledge transfer. When the acquiring company has a dominant position, it typi-
cally removes autonomy from the target company and imposes a rigorous set of rules, 
systems and performance expectations, upon it to gain quick control (Datta and Grant, 
1990). Since tight controls tend to signal the absence of trust, their use generally results 
in a cycle of escalating distrust and can lead to a worsening of the performance.  
Autonomy removal can be devastating from the perspective of the managers and employ-
ees of the target company and it can result, for example, in reduced commitment and 
motivation and, in extreme cases, in resentment, anger and hostility (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989), as members of the target firm vigorously defend their autonomy (a sit-
uation termed “conquering army syndrome” by Datta and Grand (1990)). Post-merger 
organizational identification is lower when employees feel dominated by the acquirer 
(Graebner et al., 2017). 
Therefore, we want to test if there are performance differences between acquisitions (of 
assets and majority interest) and mergers. Out of 75 matched treated companies, 22 have 
been subject to merger and 53 to foreign acquisition. 
Let 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖 a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is a merger and equal to 0 if the deal 
is an acquisition of assets or an acquisition of majority interests: 
 Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + δ(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖) + Δ𝜀i (12) 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 42) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and sales (where 𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = Δsales), distin-
guish M&A by deal form. In case of merger, the effect on sales is positive and non-sig-
nificant (B=152.9763; t=0.04; p>0.1) while the effect in case of acquisition is positive 
and non-significant (B=3134.432; t=0.81; p>0.1).  
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We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 43) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and ROA (where 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑎 = ΔROA), distinguish 
M&A by deal form. The model has a low quality (p>0.1). Our regression output shows 
that foreign mergers have a non-significant and positive effect on ROA (B=0.1595; 
t=0.92; p>0.1). Conversely, foreign acquisitions show a non-significant and negative ef-
fect on ROA (B=-0.0185; t=-0.88; p>0.1). 
Table 42 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales (Ac-
quisitions vs Mergers) 
 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 44) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and EBITDA margin (where 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑚 =
ΔEBITDAmargin), distinguish M&A by deal form. The model adopted is appropriate to 
explain the effects of foreign mergers on EBITDA margin (p<0.05). The empirical results 
suggest that in case of cross-border mergers, the effect on EBITDA margin is significant 
and positive (B=1.0025; t=2.80; p<0.01). Foreign acquisitions have a positive but not 
significant effect on EBITDA margin (B=0.2168; t=1.10; p>0.1). This result seems to 
suggest that in mergers, where it is more common to find logic of cooperation compared 
to acquisitions (where logic of predominance of the foreign acquirer can prevail), the 
effects on profitability measured by EBITDA margin is positive and significant. 
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Table 43 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA (Ac-
quisitions vs Mergers) 
 
Table 44 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA 
margin (Acquisitions vs Mergers) 
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4.8 Post-M&A performance based on the size of the target company 
Target size can be an important indicator of the M&As reasons and resulting outcomes. 
SMEs are more likely to be acquired due to efficiency motives, while large firms can be 
acquired due to both efficiency and managerial synergy motives, therefore such differ-
ence in motives can also result in different post-acquisition performance.  
For this reason, equation 7 was re-estimated by taking into account target size. Out of 75 
matched treated companies, 63 are SMEs and 12 are large companies. 
Let 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖 a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is a SME (measured by average sales 
three-years before the M&A < €50 million) and equal to 0 if it a large company (average 
sales before the M&A > €50 million): 
 Δ𝑌𝑖 = 𝜆
′ + 𝛽𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + δ(𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖) + Δ𝜀i (13) 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 45) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and sales (where 𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = Δsales), distin-
guish M&A by target size (SME vs large companies). The effect of foreign ownership on 
SMEs is negative and not significant (B= -1195.316; t= -0.42; p>0.1). Conversely, even 
if large companies acquired by foreign investors show a significant and positive effect on 
sales (B=20399.61; t=1.81; p<0.1), the regression model has a low quality (p>0.1) and 
does not show a statistically significant relationship between the outcome variable and 
the dependent variables. 
We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 46) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and ROA (where 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑎 = ΔROA), distinguish 
M&A by target size (SME vs large companies). The model has a p-value higher than 0.1 
and does not show a statistically significant relationship between ROA and the independ-
ent variables. On the one hand, SMEs acquired by foreign investors show a positive and 
non-significant effect on ROA (B=0.0442; t=0.69; p>0.1). On the other hand, large do-
mestic firms acquired by foreign companies show a negative and non-significant effect 
(B=-0.0218; t= -0.90; p>0.1). 
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Table 45 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable Sales 
(SMEs vs large companies) 
 
Table 46 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable ROA 
(SMEs vs large companies) 
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We performed a first-difference regression analysis in Stata (Table 47) in order to analyse 
the relationship between foreign ownership and EBITDA margin (where 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑚 =
ΔEBITDAmargin), distinguish M&A by target size (SME vs large companies). The 
model shows a statistically significant relationship between foreign acquisition/owner-
ship of SMEs and the outcome of interest EBITDA margin. SMEs acquired by foreign 
companies show a significant and positive effect on profitability measured by EBITDA 
margin (B=0.5074; t=2.23; p<0.05). These results reflect the findings of Sinani and Meyer 
(2004) which argued that SMEs are more flexible and more likely to benefit from acquisition 
in the short term. Conversely, in large acquisitions, the integration process may last for sev-
eral years (Thanos and Papadakis, 2012).  
Table 47 DID estimation through a first-difference regression model: output variable EBITDA 
margin (SMEs vs large companies) 
4.9 Limitations and future research  
This study presents a number of limitations and suggests some avenues for future re-
search. Firstly, the analysis was based on the comparison between foreign acquired firms 
and domestically-owned firms. Nevertheless, the permanence in Italian hands from 2008 
to 2016 does not exclude that some companies may have been acquired by other domestic 
firms. If the frequency of domestic deals in the control group is relevant, our results could 
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be influenced by this factor. Moreover, our post-acquisition performance can consider 
only companies that in the three years after the deal did not fail, were not incorporated, 
and publish balance sheet. The necessary observation of the only companies that survive 
imply the presence of the “survivorship bias” problem that appears to be technically not 
eliminable from the existing literature (Barbaresco et al., 2018). 
Our empirical findings should be evaluated with care as regards their applicability in case 
of emerging countries’ acquirers. This is due to the fact that our sample consists of small 
number of cross-border M&As in which more than 90% of the acquirers are headquar-
tered in developed countries. Another limitation of this study is that, the empirical strat-
egy adopted (DID combined with CEM) is based on accounting-based measures that have 
two drawbacks when assessing the success of M&As. First, reliability of the accounting-
based measures is subject to the quality of the annual financial statements. Secondly, as-
pects of nonfinancial performance are not captured by using accounting measures. Given 
that M&A performance is a multidimensional construct referring to both financial and 
nonfinancial performance, the solely use of accounting measures results in incomplete 
knowledge.  
Future research could add to equation 7 some non-financial covariate to improve the 
model by considering, for example, some additional information on the type of acquisi-
tion (related or unrelated), deal purpose30, post-merger integration process31, changes in 
management after the M&A, acquirer’s previous experience in M&As, acquirer’s expe-
rience in the target country, etc. Alternatively, future studies could combine the statistical 
approach adopted in this study with interviews to managers of target and acquiring com-
panies in order to discern motivations, implementing procedures, post-acquisition inte-
gration process, etc.  
Moreover, future studies should try to investigate a longer period of time since, as sug-
gested also by Chen (2011), foreign acquisition effects can manifest after a few years 
from the closure of the deals. However, it is difficult to assess a priori how many years it 
takes for the possible effects of an ownership change to manifest completely. 
                                                 
 
30 Rothaermel, F. T. (2015) illustrates three main reasons to make acquisitions: gaining access to new mar-
kets and distributions channels; gaining access to new capability or competency; pre-empting rivals. 
31 Haspeslagh, P. C. and Jemison, D. B. (1991) identified four PMI strategies. Namely: preservation, symbi-
osis, holding and absorption. 
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4.10 Conclusions 
Our findings, in line with the studies conducted by Barbaresco et al. (2018), Bentivogli 
and Mirenda (2017), ICE & Prometeia (2014) and Piscitello & Rabbiosi (2005), do not 
give support to the worries that cross-border M&As may lead to sudden performance 
deterioration of the acquired companies. We apply a methodological approach similar to 
Bentivogli and Mirenda (2017) and ICE and Prometeia (2014) by combining DID with a 
matching procedure. However, while most of the studies use propensity score matching, 
we adopt coarsened exact matching (CEM) that to our knowledge was never used in 
cross-border M&A literature. 
After building a treated and control group and running a regression in first differences for 
each outcome of interest, we find significant and positive effects on EBITDA margin due 
to the foreign ownership, and non-significant and positive effects on sales and ROA.  
Table 48 reports the results of the DID matching estimator. In each cell, the first term 
shows the effect of foreign M&A on the target firm’s 3-years average outcome of interest 
(i.e. sales, ROA, EBITDA margin) after the takeover. Robust standard errors are enclosed 
in parentheses. The first row provides aggregate results while the following rows report 
results for the different sub-groups analyzed: target macro industry (manufacturing vs 
services), acquirer’s region (European vs non-European; Latin-European vs Others); form 
of the deal (mergers vs acquisitions); target size (SMEs vs large companies).  
From an aggregate point of view, the effects for both sales and ROA are positive but not 
significant (p>0.1). However, we find that foreign-acquired firms have, on average, 
45.04% higher EBITDA margin in the three years after the takeover compared to domes-
tic firms that had a similar ex-ante takeover probability of becoming a foreign M&A tar-
get. The results indicate some differences in the sub-groups analysed. Firstly, national 
cultural distance appears to have a significant (p<0.05) effect on the post-acquisition per-
formance of the target. When the acquirer is culturally distant from the target based on 
Ronen and Shenkar (2013) classification (i.e. when it is not based in Latin Europe), for-
eign-acquired companies have, on average, 53.98% higher EBITDA margin in the three 
years after the takeover than counterfactuals. Our findings suggest that when the acquirer 
is culturally distant, targets might access to diverse routines and repertoires which are 
beneficial to their performance. Moreover, findings suggest that targets firms in the man-
ufacturing firms have the higher improvement in EBITDA margin, with a 60.99% higher 
ratio (95% level of significance) than control group units. This suggest that firms in the 
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services sector are more difficult to integrate because of the higher component of human 
capital and usually intangible assets. Findings indicate also different effects on the target 
performance according to the form of the deal analysed. Specifically, domestic firms sub-
ject to a foreign merger have a significant and positive improvement (B=1.0025; p<0.001) 
compared to local firms with a similar ex ante likelihood of being acquired. These results 
could be due to the fact that the merger implies a greater complementarity between the 
target and the acquirer (in terms of ex-ante evaluation) while, vice versa, an acquisition 
could be made for simply scale reasons. It is plausible to assume also that in case of 
mergers the previous owner and/or manager is held within the company, and that the 
foreign acquirer merely integrates the information and control systems but grants auton-
omy to those who have run the business up to that moment. In this way, when local com-
panies are included into a largest vehicle through a merger, foreign ownership can act as 
an accelerator for performance. Furthermore, results show that the effect on EBITDA 
margin is larger and significant only for SMEs (B=0.5074; p<0.05). This result is con-
sistent with the findings of Sinani and Meyer (2004) and Thanos and Papadakis (2012) 
which state that SMEs are more likely to benefit from acquisition in the short term while in 
large acquisitions the integration process may last for several years.  
Finally, our work suggests that foreign ownership does matter, having per se a positive 
and significant effect on firms’ performance. However, we find significant effects on 
EBITDA margin but no significant effects on sales growth. This finding suggests that 
EBITDA margin probably improves not because sales decrease but because operating 
costs decrease (e.g. elimination of redundant costs, lower advertising or R&D expenses, 
lower wages because of downsizing etc.). This aspect seems to testify that it is easier to 
“cut costs” by realizing synergies rather than increase the turnover of the target company.  
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Table 48 Difference in differences: The effects of foreign M&As on target firm's performance 
VARIABLE SALES-DIFF ROA -DIFF EBITDA MARGIN -DIFF 
Aggregate level 2259.872 
(3407.41) 
0.0337 
(0.0541) 
0.4504** 
(0.2170) 
EU Acquirer 861.629 
(3578.689) 
0.0628 
(0.0831) 
0.4407 
(0.2331) 
Non-EU acquirer 4745.637 
(5026.018) 
-0.0181 
(0.0200) 
0.4673 
(0.2550) 
Latin Europe acquirer 3614.293 
(6950.375) 
-0.0319 
 (0.0345) 
0.1507 
(0.1931) 
Non-Latin Europe acquirer 1862.887 
(3378.071) 
0.0529 
(0.0688) 
0.5398** 
(0.2330) 
Manufacturing (target) 3698.949 
(4708.959) 
-0.0139  
(0.0205) 
0.6099**  
(0.2676) 
Services (target) 781.9007 
(3256.196) 
0.0826 
(0.1064) 
0.2820 
(0.2056) 
Mergers 152.9763 
(4067.463) 
0.1595 
(0.1738) 
1.0025*** 
(0.3586) 
Acquisitions 3134.432 
(3857.647) 
-0.0185 
(0.0209) 
0.2168 
(0.1966) 
SMEs -1195.316 
(2858.365) 
0.0442 
(0.0641) 
0.5074** 
(0.2275) 
Large companies 20399.61 
(11267.8) 
-0.0218 
(0.0241) 
0.1561 
(0.1931) 
Notes: 
(i) N=150 companies (75 treated and 75 control) for Sales and ROA; N=148 for EBITDA margin (74 treated 
and 74 controls) 
(ii) Robust standard errors are enclosed in parentheses. 
(iii) ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
APPENDIX 
Appendix I 
Table 49 Number of companies by industry 
ATECO 
2007 - 
3 DIGIT 
CODE DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIVITIES 
CONTROL 
SAMPLE 
TREATED 
GROUP TOTAL 
105 Industria lattiero-casearia 653 1 654 
106 
Lavorazione delle granaglie, produzione di amidi e di prodotti 
amidacei 
372 1 373 
108 Produzione di altri prodotti alimentari 877 2 879 
141 
Confezione di articoli di abbigliamento (escluso abbigliamento 
in pelliccia) 
2.640 1 2.641 
151 
Preparazione e concia del cuoio; fabbricazione di articoli da 
viaggio, borse, pelletteria e selleria; preparazione e tintura di 
pellicce 
1.187 1 1.188 
152 Fabbricazione di calzature 1.474 1 1.475 
172 Fabbricazione di articoli di carta e cartone 1.337 1 1.338 
181 Stampa e servizi connessi alla stampa 2.387 - 2.387 
200 Fabbricazione di prodotti chimici 67 1 68 
203 
Fabbricazione di pitture, vernici e smalti, inchiostri da stampa 
e adesivi sintetici 
422 1 423 
205 Fabbricazione di altri prodotti chimici 682 1 683 
212 Fabbricazione di medicinali e preparati farmaceutici 259 1 260 
222 Fabbricazione di articoli in materie plastiche 3.631 3 3.634 
233 Fabbricazione di materiali da costruzione in terracotta 323 2 325 
241 Siderurgia 159 1 160 
243 
Fabbricazione di altri prodotti della prima trasformazione 
dell'acciaio 
365 1 366 
245 Fonderie 552 - 552 
255 
Fucinatura, imbutitura, stampaggio e profilatura dei metalli; 
metallurgia delle polveri 
1.023 - 1.023 
256 
Trattamento e rivestimento dei metalli; lavori di meccanica 
generale 
6.330 2 6.332 
259 Fabbricazione di altri prodotti in metallo 2.346 1 2.347 
263 Fabbricazione di apparecchiature per le telecomunicazioni 451 2 453 
265 
Fabbricazione di strumenti e apparecchi di misurazione, 
prova e navigazione; orologi 
625 3 628 
267 Fabbricazione di strumenti ottici e attrezzature fotografiche 101 1 102 
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273 Fabbricazione di cablaggi e apparecchiature di cablaggio 496 1 497 
274 Fabbricazione di apparecchiature per illuminazione 444 - 444 
279 Fabbricazione di altre apparecchiature elettriche 1.202 - 1.202 
281 Fabbricazione di macchine di impiego generale 1.279 3 1.282 
282 Fabbricazione di altre macchine di impiego generale 4.079 5 4.084 
289 Fabbricazione di altre macchine per impieghi speciali 2.570 4 2.574 
293 
Fabbricazione di parti ed accessori per autoveicoli e loro 
motori 
662 2 664 
301 Costruzione di navi e imbarcazioni 685 1 686 
323 Fabbricazione di articoli sportivi 137 1 138 
325 Fabbricazione di strumenti e forniture mediche e dentistiche 717 1 718 
332 Installazione di macchine ed apparecchiature industriali 1.348 1 1.349 
351 Produzione, trasmissione e distribuzione di energia elettrica 1.870 7 1.877 
390 Attività di risanamento e altri servizi di gestione dei rifiuti 218 - 218 
422 Costruzione di opere di pubblica utilità 577 - 577 
464 Commercio all'ingrosso di beni di consumo finale 11.992 3 11.995 
465 Commercio all'ingrosso di apparecchiature ict 1.973 1 1.974 
466 
Commercio all'ingrosso di altri macchinari, attrezzature e 
forniture 
6.661 1 6.662 
467 Commercio all'ingrosso specializzato di altri prodotti 11.505 2 11.507 
471 Commercio al dettaglio in esercizi non specializzati 3.753 1 3.754 
477 Commercio al dettaglio di altri prodotti in esercizi specializzati 9.098 2 9.100 
494 Trasporto di merci su strada e servizi di trasloco 5.848 2 5.850 
521 Magazzinaggio e custodia 614 1 615 
522 Attività di supporto ai trasporti 4.152 1 4.153 
551 Alberghi e strutture simili 5.069 1 5.070 
582 Edizione di software 119 1 120 
610 Telecomunicazioni 131 1 132 
611 Telecomunicazioni fisse 40 1 41 
619 Altre attività di telecomunicazione 384 - 384 
620 
Produzione di software, consulenza informatica e attività 
connesse 
7.452 12 7.464 
631 Elaborazione dei dati, hosting e attività connesse; portali web 6.184 1 6.185 
681 Compravendita di beni immobili effettuata su beni propri 30.413 1 30.414 
701 Attività di direzione aziendale 2.713 1 2.714 
702 Attività di consulenza gestionale 7.577 1 7.578 
711 
Attività degli studi di architettura, ingegneria ed altri studi 
tecnici 
4.572 2 4.574 
712 Collaudi ed analisi tecniche 1.368 3 1.371 
731 Pubblicità 2.629 - 2.629 
732 Ricerche di mercato e sondaggi di opinione 992 2 994 
741 Attività di design specializzate 1.259 - 1.259 
771 Noleggio di autoveicoli 469 1 470 
774 
Concessione dei diritti di sfruttamento di proprietà intellettuale 
e prodotti simili (escluse le opere protette dal copyright) 
256 1 257 
829 Servizi di supporto alle imprese nca 3.812 1 3.813 
869 Altri servizi di assistenza sanitaria 1.973 - 1.973 
931 Attività sportive 1.855 1 1.856 
960 Altre attività di servizi per la persona 2.250 1 2.251 
TOTAL  181.660 100 181.760 
Source: elaboration of the author 
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Appendix II 
Note: trends for the matched groups are compared before 2011 (2011 represents the first 
treatment year in our sample). In this way we are sure that treated companies are domes-
tically-owned before the M&A. 
Figure 27 Evidence of parallel trend assumption before 2011 for sales (matched dataset: 
treated and control groups) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author  
Figure 28 Evidence of parallel trend assumption before 2011 for EBITDA margin (matched da-
taset: treated and control groups) 
 
Source: elaboration of the author 
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Figure 29 Evidence of parallel trend assumption before 2011 for ROA (matched dataset: 
treated and control groups) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration of the author  
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